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ABSTRACT 
 In an effort to address the growing problem of “overtreatment” in 
American health care, the federal government has turned to its 150-
year-old statute, the civil False Claims Act (“FCA”) to prosecute pro-
viders who do too much.  Lacking many of the traditional hallmarks 
of conventional health care fraud scenarios, this new enforcement 
framework features cases in which the government alleges that a pro-
vider is administering health care that is inefficient, too costly, or 
unnecessary.  As I have argued before, in addition to ensnaring 
“innocent” providers, this regulatory regime allows the federal gov-
ernment to both (1) freeze practice standards by arresting their natu-
ral evolution and (2) unilaterally limit care by engaging in what 
can be called “backdoor rationing.”  In addition to largely shutting 
out the medical community during these initiatives, this chosen en-
forcement framework’s failures are compounded by the fact that the 
real causes of overtreatment—deep, structural challenges—are left 
largely unaddressed by the government’s investigations. 
 This Article builds upon my previous scholarship by firmly situat-
ing the regulation of overtreatment within the robust scholarship of 
enforcement literature.  After examining overcriminalization and 
overenforcement, this analysis argues that unique factors character-
izing the enforcement of overtreatment—the existence of a widely ap-
plicable and powerful statute in the FCA, political pressure, and fi-
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nancial reward to increase the number of health care fraud investi-
gations—and comparatively easy resolution of allegations that result 
in lucrative settlement without litigation put the enforcement frame-
work at risk for overuse.  And like other regimes susceptible to overen-
forcement or overcriminalization, the regulation of overtreatment is 
highly reliant on prosecutorial discretion in determining both the 
targets of and penalties for alleged overtreatment violations. 
 A framework susceptible to disorder ensues.  Such a regime risks 
provider buy-in, resulting in increased tension between the medical 
profession and the prosecutors tasked with regulating it.  Most stark-
ly, whether the enforcement framework actually nets the “worst” ac-
tors or not remains an unanswered question.  By identifying the 
FCA’s enforcement mechanisms most at risk to overuse, this piece 
seeks to recalibrate the federal government’s chosen strategy to regu-
late health care fraud, injecting much-needed consistency to improve 
what scholars have called the chaotic, unfair, and disordered 
framework that currently characterizes health care fraud enforce-
ment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) overtreatment enforcement 
strategy—characterized by pursuing and prosecuting providers who 
provide care that is allegedly unnecessary, inefficient, or too expen-
sive—naturally coincides with a time of unprecedented challenge and 
change for health care administration in this country.  Most notably, 
although politically battered1 and judicially reshaped,2 the Patient 
                                                        
 1.  By the summer of 2013, Republicans in the House of Representatives had voted 
forty times to repeal either part of, or all of, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 (“ACA”).  See Sam Baker, Week Ahead: ObamaCare Repeal Vote No. 40 Looms in 
House, THE HILL (July 29, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-
implementation/313967-week-ahead-obamacare-repeal-vote-no-40-looms-in-house.  Fur-
ther, the public continues to be skeptical of the law.  As of June of 2013, only thirty-seven 
percent of respondents of an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll thought the ACA was 
“considered a good idea,” while forty-nine percent thought the ACA was “a bad idea.”  See 
Tal Kopan, Poll Finds Low Support for Obama-care, POLITICO (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/obamacare-poll-92322.html (noting that 
“Obamacare is more unpopular than ever”).  A year before, in July 2012, forty percent of 
respondents to the same poll said the ACA was a good idea, whereas forty-four percent an-
swered that it was a bad idea.  See Mark Murray, Health Care Law’s Unpopularity Reaches New 
Highs, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2013), 
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/06/18781204-health-care-laws-
unpopularity-reaches-new-highs?lite. 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) limps toward full 
implementation with varying degrees of state support3 while suffering 
from constant attacks from the political right4 and self-imposed im-
plementation spasms.5  Just as newsworthy, however, are the multifac-
eted cost crises plaguing health care administration and delivery in 
the United States—crises that, in effect, precipitated the passage of 
the ACA.  Although slowing,6 health care expenditures continue to 
                                                        
 2.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (upholding 
the law as rooted in Congress’s taxing and spending power but eliminating the Medicaid 
expansion requirement in the law). 
 3.  By late May of 2013, only seventeen states had decided to implement their own 
state-based insurance exchange; an additional seven had decided to implement some sort 
of partnership with the federal government.  State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance 
Marketplaces, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 28, 2013), http://kff.org/health-
reform/state-indicator/health-insurance-exchanges/#map.  
By March of 2014, twenty-seven states (including the District of Columbia) had decid-
ed to expand their Medicaid programs, while twenty-four states—largely centered in the 
South—had decided to decline expanding their Medicaid programs.  “Open debate” ex-
isted in five states.  See The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States That Do Not Expand 
Medicaid, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 31, 2014), 
http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/analyzing-the-impact-of-state-medicaid-expansion-
decisions/.  As of Aug. 28, 2013, another source noted that twenty-seven states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia were moving toward expansion.  Medicaid Expansion Map, AMERICAN 
HEALTH LINE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.americanhealthline.com/Analysis-and-
Insight/Infographics/Medicaid-Expansion-Map. 
 4.  House Republicans voted to repeal forty times by the summer of 2013.  See supra 
note 1 and accompanying text.  Late in July of 2013, Senate Republicans were “coalescing 
around a proposal to block any government funding resolution that includes money for 
the implementation of the 2010 Affordable Care Act.”  Alexander Bolton, Government 
Shutdown Looms over Obama Care, THE HILL (July 23, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/312727-shutdown-looms-over-obamacare. 
 5.  See Robert Pear, et al., From the Start, Signs of Trouble at Health Portal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/us/politics/from-the-start-signs-of-
trouble-at-health-portal.html?_r=0 (“For the past 12 days, a system costing more than $400 
million and billed as a one-stop click-and-go hub for citizens seeking health insurance has 
thwarted the efforts of millions to simply log in.”); see also Jonathan Allen, Official Who Led 
HealthCare.gov Rollout Steps Down, POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/healthcaregov-rollout-official-steps-down-
101607.html (describing the ACA website rollout as “botched”). 
 6.  Kelly Kennedy, White House Touts Slow Increase in Health Care Costs, USA TODAY (July 
29, 2013), www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/29/administration-lowered-
premiums-white-house/2596453/ (noting that a May of 2013 Congressional Budget Office 
report “showed a $618 billion drop in projected Medicare and Medicaid spending over the 
next decade” and a recent Department of Health and Human Services report showed that 
employer-based insurance premiums rose only three percent from 2011 to 2012—“the 
lowest increase since 1996”); see Chris Fleming, New Health Affairs Issue: Will the Health Care 
Spending Growth Slowdown Last?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 6, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/05/06/new-health-affairs-issue-will-the-health-care-
spending-growth-slowdown-last/ (noting that a “record slowdown in growth” occurred be-
tween 2007 and 2011); Kenneth Kaufman & Mark Grube, The Slowing of Health Care Spend-
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rise,7 and the ultimate impact of the ACA’s wholesale changes remains 
largely unknown.8 
Distinct from the access-securing focus of the ACA, one of the 
major root causes of the cost crisis in American health care is what I 
and author Shannon Brownlee have referred to as overtreatment.9   De-
fined as inefficient, unnecessary, or overused medical procedures and 
services, overtreatment occurs as a result of America’s structural inef-
ficiencies and upside-down incentives that encourage health care pro-
fessionals to constantly provide more—and more expensive—health 
care.10 
In addition to a legislative solution in the ACA, the federal gov-
ernment has responded to the problem of health care expenditure 
growth with a renewed focus on prosecuting and preventing health 
care fraud, in which it—through federal prosecutors at the DOJ—
seeks liability for individual providers and hospitals under intent-
based civil fraud statutes like the federal civil False Claims Act 
(“FCA”).11  The DOJ has now sought to apply the FCA to cases of 
overtreatment, asserting that, in many cases, the provision of more or 
more expensive services by itself constitutes health care fraud. 
Using available federal statutes to prosecute those who unjustly 
siphon money from federal health care programs appears to be a ra-
tional way to put money back into the Medicare trust fund, even if the 
data show that only a fraction of total health care waste in the system 
                                                        
ing: Have We Turned a Corner?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/08/09/the-slowing-of-health-care-spending-have-we-
turned-a-corner/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-slowing-of-
health-care-spending-have-we-turned-a-corner (noting that in 2011, overall health care 
spending increased 3.9%, down from a high of 11% in 1990 and even 7.6% in 2007). 
 7.  See Eduardo Porter, A World of Rising Health Care Costs, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (June 
27, 2013), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/a-world-of-rising-health-care-
costs/. 
 8.  See Thomas Daschle & Bill Frist, Technology and the Changing Business of Health Care, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/08/14/technology-and-the-changing-business-of-
health-care/ (noting the ACA’s goal of cost-cutting through a focus on quality-based reim-
bursement, accountable care organizations, and patient-centered medical homes). 
9.  See SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US 
SICKER AND POORER (2007); Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act 
to Target Overtreatment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463, 465–66 (2013). 
 10.  See supra note 9. 
 11.  As an example, in 2011, health care fraud prosecutions rose to 1,235, a rise of 69% 
from 2010 (when there were 731 prosecutions).  See Record Number of Federal Criminal Health 
Care Fraud Prosecutions Filed in FY 2011, TRAC REPORTS (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/270/. 
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is a result of health care fraud.12  Granted, every little bit helps, and 
with fraud prevention and prosecution constituting a lucrative13 and 
universally politically popular investment for the federal government 
in an era of tight budgets and partisan gridlock,14 this tougher stance 
on fraud and abuse shows no signs of abating. 
But even if the federal government’s chosen course of action is 
rational, lucrative, and politically popular, it should not escape in-
depth legal and policy-based review.  Penalizing overtreatment 
through application of the FCA has become common, but legal 
scholarly critique of the phenomenon has not occurred in earnest.  In 
a previous piece,15 I highlighted potential practical concerns with the 
federal government’s approach—specifically, that pursuing providers 
engaged in overtreatment in this way may over-capture those provid-
ers administering clinically beneficial care.  Results of this over-
capture could be detrimental to quality of care and may stoke provid-
er distrust of the law, pushing all providers into damagingly believing 
the regulatory framework is unpredictable, unguided, and unre-
strained.16 
But beyond the practical impact overtreatment enforcement ini-
tiatives may have on clinical care,17 this Article advances the analysis 
by examining the overtreatment enforcement framework’s particular 
susceptibility to overenforcement.  By filling a gap in current scholar-
ship, this piece seeks to place the regulation of overtreatment within 
                                                        
 12.  See infra note 86–87 and accompanying text; see also PIERRE L. YONG & LEIGHANNE 
OLSEN, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE HEALTHCARE 
IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES: WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY 
51–52 (2010).  
 13.  See Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Set-
tlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-
in-fraud-settlement.html? (“The Justice Department contends the prosecutions are well 
worth the effort—reaping more than $15 in recoveries for every $1 it spends, by one esti-
mate”).  Other estimates are lower.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services Announce Record-
Breaking Recoveries Resulting from Joint Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud (Feb. 26, 
2014),  http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/02/20140226a.html (noting that “for 
every dollar spent on health care-related fraud and abuse investigations through this and 
other programs in the last three years, the government recovered $8.10”). 
 14.  See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 715, 731–32 (2013) (explaining that being tougher on crime “costs legislators 
nothing and garners them political capital”). 
 15.  See Buck, supra note 9. 
 16.  See Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government 
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 210 (2001). 
 17.  See Buck, supra note 9. 
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the rich literature of overcriminalization and overenforcement in an 
effort to identify the stark challenges that may accompany the DOJ’s 
settlement-driven approach. 
Unique factors—such as the uncommon breadth of the FCA, its 
ease of applicability, and the lucrative investment for the govern-
ment—make fraud enforcement actions attractive for federal prose-
cutors.  And because proving a health care fraud case at trial is inher-
ently difficult, prosecutors rely nearly exclusively on achieving 
settlement with targeted providers.  Without the purifier of trial, and 
with no real limiting force, the result is a regulatory strategy that is 
susceptible to being overused and over-applied.  This precipitates an 
enforcement framework that not only over-captures individual pro-
viders, but fails to appropriately differentiate providers whose mis-
conduct and individual level of culpability varies. 
This Article will proceed in five parts.  Part I will examine the lit-
erature on overenforcement and overcriminalization in an effort to 
provide doctrinal footing for a meaningful review.  In particular, Part 
One will identify the concerns associated with “random enforcement” 
and “definitional spillover.”  Part II will summarize the modern over-
treatment enforcement regime, complete with a presentation of the 
nationwide investigation that best illustrates the DOJ’s enforcement 
strategy.  Part III will examine the FCA, the DOJ’s primary tool in en-
forcing overtreatment, with a particular focus on the parts of the law 
that allow for potentially disordering inconsistencies in its application.  
Part IV will highlight specific application-based challenges within the 
settlement-based regulatory framework that make it susceptible to 
overenforcement and disarray.  Finally, in Part V, the article will begin 
the conversation toward an improved framework focused on the in-
clusion of clinical expertise within the legal regime. 
Ultimately, this Article seeks to recalibrate the enforcement 
mechanism in an effort to alleviate the medical and legal tension that 
currently characterizes health care fraud regulation.  At bottom, it at-
tempts to bring the two equally-important, but often conflicted, re-
gimes of law and medicine into harmony during this critical time for 
health care administration and delivery in the United States. 
I.  REGULATORY FEVERISHNESS 
The tenets of overenforcement and the related doctrine of over-
criminalization can provide key insights and cautionary warnings for 
those tasked with regulating health fraud.  Even though a number of 
writers have focused their scholarship on overcriminalization in re-
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cent years18—in particular analyzing whether the criminal sanction is 
appropriate in certain contexts—the instant analysis seeks to avoid fo-
cusing on the moral effects of an ever-expanding modern criminal 
law.  Indeed, the FCA—the DOJ’s chosen tool for regulating over-
treatment—is a civil statute, and many of the protections that are af-
forded criminal defendants do not translate to the civil context.  Nev-
ertheless, overcriminalization theory is helpful to the analysis for its 
doctrinal value and will be consulted where relevant.  In addition to 
examining the causes and consequences of overenforcement and 
overcriminalization, this analysis will present the challenges of “ran-
dom” enforcement. 
A.  Overenforcement and Overcriminalization 
Generally, overenforcement has been a focus of scholars in dis-
parate areas of the law, from securities regulation,19 to criminal copy-
right laws,20 to antitrust,21 to law enforcement officers’ regulation of 
protestors.22  Professor Dayna Bowen Matthew has noted a particularly 
applicable point that the qui tam provisions23 in the FCA can lead to 
overenforcement of the statute in the pharmaceutical fraud context.24  
She notes that “[t]he availability of private enforcers creates signifi-
cant opportunities for public prosecutors to overenforce.”25 
Overenforcement has been defined as occurring “when the viola-
tor of a legal rule suffers excessive harm—or more harm than is nec-
essary for optimal deterrence—from the actual implementation of 
                                                        
 18.  See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminali-
zation and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997); Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005). 
 19.  See James J. Park, Rule 10B-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 345, 409 (2010); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 
(2008). 
 20.  See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 785 (2005) (defining over-
criminalization as “when the costs of treating conduct as a crime exceed the benefits of the 
new criminal law”). 
 21.  See Warren F. Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. 
L.J. 1075 (1980). 
 22.  See Alafair Burke, Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1002 
(2013). 
 23.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012). 
 24.  For analysis of how the qui tam provisions of the FCA cause overenforcement, see 
Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The 
Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281 (2007). 
 25.  Id. at 282. 
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that rule.”26  Granted, “any enforcement system mistakenly treats 
some nonviolators as violators and subjects them to sanctions,”27 but 
“excessive sanctions produce overenforcement—a level of enforce-
ment at which the costs of deterrence marginally exceed its bene-
fits.”28 
Whereas overenforcement relates to a characteristic of an en-
forcement mechanism or general penalty, overcriminalization focuses 
on overbroad statutes that criminalize allegedly non-culpable or 
harmless behavior.  Overcriminalization applies to instances in which 
laws “impos[e] penal sanctions on conduct that should be solely a 
matter of individual morality” or “perhaps left to the good sense of 
the individual.”29  Further, it may “punish conduct that traditionally 
would not be deemed morally blameworthy”30 at all. 
More broadly, overcriminalization can include “what should be 
denominated as a crime and when it should be enforced; who falls 
within the law’s strictures or, conversely, avoids liability altogether; 
and what should be the boundaries of punishment and the proper 
sentence in specific cases.”31  The modern proliferation of federal 
criminal statutes32 has fed arguments that Congress has excessively 
expanded the criminal sanction to regulate activities and govern situ-
ations where it does not belong.33 
1.  The Drivers of Overenforcement 
Scholars note that the causes of overenforcement and overcrimi-
nalization are rooted in congressional halls and American newsrooms; 
the worst actors in a given industry drive the regulatory machinery by 
grabbing the attention of the lawmakers and news media.34  One 
scholar states: 
                                                        
 26.  See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744 
(2005).  
 27.  Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 573 (1981). 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress 
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005). 
 30.  See Larkin, supra note 14, at 719. 
 31.  See Luna, supra note 18, at 713. 
 32.  See Larkin, supra note 14, at 725–26 (noting numbers of statutes). 
 33.  See, e.g., Green, supra note 18, at 1535. 
 34.  See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 853, 859 (2014) (noting that “public enforcement may sometimes be over-
zealous, particularly when politicians react to well-publicized scandals”). 
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 Cognitive errors and biases tend to support a one way 
ratchet toward the enactment of additional crimes and 
harsher penalties. . . . These errors and biases lead people to 
recall media accounts of serious crimes, to overestimate 
their frequency, and to jump to the conclusion that addi-
tional harsher laws are needed.  These flames are fanned by 
the news media, which has an economic incentive to portray 
violent crime in news programming as well as entertainment 
programming.35 
Where media outlets “fan the flames” that stoke harsher laws, 
Congress converts the public outcry into codified law.36  This is a ra-
ther uncontroversial move for politicians to make, especially in the 
face of charges that they fail to compromise on just about anything.37  
Toughening penalties against wrongdoers becomes an opportunity 
for increasingly rare unifying legislative activities and “ready-made 
publicity stunts.”38  Indeed, “[c]onventional wisdom suggests that ap-
pearing tough on crime wins elections regardless of the underlying 
justification.”39 
The political calculus leads Congress to a rather easy solution 
that is aided by two powerful factors.  First, “prosecutors are especially 
effective lobbyists for criminal law expansion,”40 often driving the bills 
across the finish line, and second, no opposing public interest groups 
push against stiffening penalties.41  As has been noted, those con-
cerned about overcriminalization argue that legislators enact addi-
tional “statutes that criminalize conduct that most people believe to 
be innocent, innocuous, or trivial,”42 and an ever-expanding statutory 
framework results.  Consequently, “[t]he politics of crime are peren-
                                                        
 35.  See Beale, supra note 29, at 773 (footnote omitted). 
 36.  See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 232 
(2007) (noting that “majority preferences lean strongly and consistently in favor of ex-
panded offenses and more severe punishment”).  
 37.  The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, which recently extended liability under 
the FCA, passed the Senate by a vote of 92–4, and the House by a vote of 367–59.  
MICHAEL TABB, GREENE LLP, THE IMPACT OF 2010 HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION ON FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION 1 & n.2 (2013), available at http://www.greenellp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/Michael-Tabb-PPACA-Amendments.pdf. 
 38.  See Luna, supra note 18, at 719. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Brown, supra note 36, at 232. 
 41.  Id. at 223. 
 42.  Id. at 229. 
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nially perverse”43—there is simply no political incentive to think twice 
about expanding anti-crime statutes. 
That is not to say all laws have boundless reaches.  Within regula-
tory regimes, Congress has attempted to steer enforcers toward the 
worst actors by limiting application of powerful statutes to the most 
culpable actors.  For example, within the white collar crime context, 
two showings—that of fraudulent scienter and a specific finding of 
harm—have been said to be generally “necessary to curb the injustice 
of overcriminalization.”44  However, like the health care fraud con-
text, in white collar criminal prosecutions scienter is generally diffi-
cult to prove,45 and prosecutors often lack demonstrative evidence of 
fraudulent intent.46  The same problem exists in identifying tangible 
harm, which leads to the development of a spiraled broadening of the 
law’s applicability:47 
These difficulties in ascertaining and proving harm result in 
Congress drafting statutes with uncertain scienter require-
ments, criminalizing vague and ambiguous harms so as to 
potentially encompass a broad array of conduct.  Congress 
thereby lets prosecutors determine what conduct to crimi-
nalize.  Such statutes shift Congress’s legislative crime-
making power to prosecutors and courts.  They also facilitate 
criminalizing conduct in hindsight . . . .  When Congress 
does not set minimum guidelines to govern law enforce-
ment, there is no limit to the conduct that can be criminal-
ized.48 
As such, an inability to satisfy the required points of proof leads 
to a softening of those requirements, and, as a result, Congress cedes 
more and more power over the enforcement framework to federal 
prosecutors by writing vaguer laws.49  This allows politicians “to appear 
tough on crime” while making sure they “avoid blame when laws do 
                                                        
 43.  Id. at 223.  
 44.  See Wesley Burrell, The Right-to-Honest-Services Doctrine—Enron’s Final Victim: Pure 
Void-for-Vagueness in Skilling v. United States, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1289, 1301 (2011). 
 45.  Id. at 1302. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. at 1302–03 (footnotes omitted). 
 49.  See Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, 
and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 723–24 (2013) (noting “Congress’s tendency to 
create vague and overlapping criminal provisions in areas already criminalized in an effort 
to expand the tools available to prosecutors”). 
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not produce desirable results.”50  As the penalties for—and applicabil-
ity of—the statute grows, the pressure on the actors charged with en-
forcing broader statutes—and charged with distinguishing between 
cases in which the statute’s application is appropriate and situations 
in which its usage might be draconian—grows as well.  The public 
wants accountability and looks toward federal prosecutors to provide 
it. 
In an effort to satisfy this pressure and the “reputational incen-
tives” present within the enforcement regime, federal prosecutors 
have to “prioritize financial recoveries” and rely on settlement in an 
effort to further impress the public and Congress.51  Large monetary 
recoveries are easy to measure and make a strong case that the regula-
tors and federal prosecutors are doing their jobs.  Increasing recovery 
amounts further convey the message that fraud is ever-present, push-
ing Congress to ratchet up resources to fight it while simultaneously 
making the statute easier to violate. 
Achieving settlement and recovering large settlements become 
easier when the legal framework is itself broad.  Where “punishments 
become grossly disproportionate to the harm they seek to avoid” the 
regime “empower[s] prosecutors to stack charges against a defend-
ant” to force a plea to avoid a trial.52  This has a doubly positive effect 
for the DOJ: it avoids the costs and risks of litigation and allows for 
federal prosecutors to increase recovery amounts, which garners more 
attention for being tougher on fraud or crime.  The pattern repeats 
itself. 
As a result, the overbroad statute and a settlement-driven regime 
become highly intertwined and reinforcing; a “symbiotic relationship 
exists between [the two] because these legal phenomena . . . rely on 
each other for their very existence.”53  Without the availability of set-
tlement, “[n]ovel legal theories and overly-broad statutes would no 
longer be tools merely for posturing during charge and sentence bar-
gaining, but would have to be defended and affirmed both morally 
and legally at trial.”54  Instead, however, prosecutors’ theories of liabil-
ity can get increasingly creative and aggressive with little limitation. 
                                                        
 50.  Burrell, supra note 44, at 1303. 
 51.  See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 34, at 880. 
 52.  Larkin, supra note 14, at 720. 
 53.  See Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea 
Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 645 (2011). 
 54.  See id. (“Further, the significant costs of prosecuting individuals with creative, ten-
uous, and technical charges would not be an abstract possibility used in determining how 
great of an incentive to offer a defendant in return for pleading guilty.  Instead, these costs 
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2.  The Effects of Overenforcement 
If overenforcement is initially caused by a perception that there is 
too little regulatory control over an industry’s professionals, its conse-
quences replant that control and discretion within the offices of fed-
eral prosecutors and regulators.  The regime rewards them with a 
large dose of decisionmaking power, which threatens to lead to regu-
latory disorder.  These concerns include the resulting (1) “excessive 
unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities” and the (2) “inevi-
table disparity among similarly situated persons.”55 
First, overbroad laws “give enforcement authorities far too much 
unchecked discretion to select those few cases that will actually be 
prosecuted.”56  A legal regime that is susceptible to overenforcement 
hands a substantial amount of discretion—a potentially “dangerous 
disparity of power”57—to federal prosecutors.  This discretion includes 
both (1) choosing who may be the target of a legal regime and 
(2) determining the individualized penalties within that framework. 
Selective enforcement defines a situation in which prosecutors 
(nearly single-handedly and with few limits) can determine who 
should be targeted by a regulatory framework.58  In the case of over-
enforcement, “[i]f almost the entire community is guilty of some 
crime, . . . [t]he question of why a particular individual was selected 
becomes . . . debatable, particularly given that arrest and charging de-
cisions are generally invisible . . . .”59  This opens the door to prosecu-
tors initially pursuing providers who may not be the most culpable.  
Indeed, “[i]t is likely that the vast majority of some health care crimes 
will not interest a federal prosecutor unless it has a certain publicity 
value,”60 and creates the potential that “prosecutors will make charg-
ing decisions based on irrational factors, such as the value that a par-
                                                        
would be a real consideration in determining whether justice is being served by bringing a 
prosecution at all.”). 
 55.  See Beale, supra note 29, at 749. 
 56.  Id. at 766. 
 57.  See Luna, supra note 18, at 725. 
 58.  See Larkin, supra note 14, at 754 (“And there is no effective control over a prosecu-
tor’s decision.”).  
 59.  Id. at 752. 
 60.  See Matthew P. Harrington, Health Care Crimes: Avoiding Overenforcement, 26 
RUTGERS L.J. 111, 148 (1994) (noting that prosecutors’ perceived application of the pro-
posed amendments to the fraud and abuse laws in the early 1990s or laws that build on the 
amendments will seem arbitrary).  
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ticular case holds for an ambitious lawyer or the number of points it 
will add to his batting average.”61 
Besides selective enforcement, overenforcement can implicate 
concerns “about the degree of law enforcement’s response, such as 
complaints that police used excessive force . . . when lesser interven-
tions would have sufficed.”62  For regulatory frameworks in which nu-
merous duplicative statutes are at the disposal of federal prosecutors, 
those enforcers still lean on the most powerful statute applicable to 
achieve maximum deterrent value.  Ultimately, those targeted may 
not have engaged in misconduct deserving of the most powerful regu-
latory tool but are nonetheless charged with a violation of that statute; 
in an effort to achieve the largest recovery, prosecutors seek to fit the 
targeted actor’s conduct into it.  In effect, a potential “race-to-the-top” 
ensues where prosecutors habitually overcharge defendants. 
Second, the enforcement framework may be arbitrarily em-
ployed.  Some actors may be likely to be “singled out for much harsh-
er treatment than others who have engaged in precisely the same 
conduct” as “[o]nly a few cases of the many can be chosen.”63  As a re-
sult, the regulated actors are targeted in what can be called “a penal 
lottery”—an enforcement framework dogged by inevitable disparities 
in meted penalties.64  When the regulatory structure is in competition 
for resources and time with other initiatives, arbitrariness can multi-
ply; some federal prosecutors will focus their energy and resources on 
regulating a particular industry, but others will not.65  Within this reg-
ulatory structure, similarly situated actors may experience differential 
treatment, and those with varying degrees of culpability may have sim-
ilar penalties assessed. 
B.  Random Enforcement and Definitional Spillover 
Disorder resulting from overcriminalization and overenforce-
ment is compounded by the challenges of so-called “random” en-
forcement.66  The random enforcement model, which holds down the 
                                                        
 61.  Larkin, supra note 14, at 751–52 (footnotes omitted). 
 62.  Burke, supra note 22, at 1004. 
 63.  Beale, supra note 29, at 766.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See Harrington, supra note 60, at 148.  
 66.  See Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9 
(2010); see also Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal 
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 489 n.119 (2008) (“Due to budgetary constraints, the 
strategy of random enforcement is widely applied to areas such as health care and safety in 
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costs of the regulatory regime by pursuing a fraction of those who 
commit misconduct, depends on enforcement in a “relatively small 
number of occasions, but impose[s] heightened penalties.”67  These 
tougher penalty amounts “are supposed to offset the diluted deter-
rence brought about by the reduced rate and correspondingly re-
duced probability of enforcement.”68  And if the penalties are high 
enough, those considering committing the same misconduct will be 
deterred away from doing so.69 
A regulatory framework dependent upon “random” enforcement 
must build into its penalty structure the possibility that a number of 
deserving actors will escape detection.70  However, even with an effi-
ciently-constructed regulatory framework, DOJ attorneys may actually 
be driven by concerns other than capturing those most deserving of 
fraud prosecution.  A particular characteristic associated with random 
enforcement is that it “is cheap, but so is the justice that it delivers.”71  
Specifically, under the random model, a regulatory framework can be 
inefficient.72  Additionally, a randomized model is limited in nature, 
and it “systematically imposes harsh penalties on a relatively small 
number of violators and lets all others go scot free,”73 further contrib-
uting to the concern over arbitrary penalty amounts.74 
Within a random enforcement framework, “because law enforc-
ers and adjudicators choose this small number of violators from a 
large pool of suspects, they have an incentive to enforce the law only 
in easy cases in which violations can easily be proven.”75  As a result, 
the enforcement framework may gravitate toward those overtreatment 
                                                        
the workplace.”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Cri-
tique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 278–79 (1999).  
 67.  Lemos & Stein, supra note 66, at 11. 
 68.  Id. at 11–14 (noting that the “penalty is increased to offset the benefit that viola-
tors expect to derive from their ex ante prospect of not being caught” (emphasis added)). 
 69.  Id. at 12. 
 70.  Id. at 14–15 (“These constraints explain the presence of the randomized enforce-
ment model, under which law enforcers apprehend and punish violators randomly and 
only once in a while, but the penalty is increased to offset the benefit that violators expect 
to derive from their ex ante prospect of not being caught.  For example, when the regular 
fine for a violation is $10,000, but law enforcers apprehend only one violator out of three, 
the fine for every convicted violator should be set at $30,000.”). 
 71.  Id. at 12. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 17. 
 74.  Id. at 12. 
 75.  Id. at 17. 
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cases for which settlement is easy to achieve76—nationwide, easy-to-
replicate investigations and initiatives immediately come to mind.77  
This will “drive [enforcers] away from sophisticated violators who are 
both able and willing to conceal their misdeeds.”78 
Finally, the random enforcement model may be further threat-
ened by the problem of so-called “definitional spillover.”79  Defini-
tional spillover occurs when 
adjudicators find the defendant liable under an overbroad 
liability rule that they correctly apply.  By overbroad, we 
mean a liability rule that captures some cases that are not 
justified by its underlying social purpose . . . .  The defend-
ant’s particular case falls within the rule’s formal prohibition 
but outside the scope of the rule’s purpose.80 
Over-deterrence clearly results when “definitional spillover” occurs, as 
“the total harm the defendant suffers from the imposition of liability 
is excessive relative to the social cost of his conduct.”81  Additionally, 
“[t]he overbroad liability rule treats these defendants exactly 
wrong.”82  Similar to the consequences of overcriminalization, captur-
ing all individuals who violate an overbroad rule treats them “indis-
criminately by holding each one liable” and “generates social costs by 
excessively deterring” socially-beneficial behavior.83  From the per-
spective of the targets, an enforcement framework afflicted with defi-
nitional spillover is affected by problems with consistency, predictabil-
ity, and fairness. 
A regulatory framework susceptible to overenforcement due to 
an overbroad legal regulation, a random enforcement model, and 
definitional spillover is at risk for disorder.  An introduction to the 
regulation of overtreatment—a regulatory regime that can be said to 
be at risk of this threat—follows. 
                                                        
 76.  See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 34, at 890 (“A large recovery may be fairly easy 
for a government attorney to win if the government’s legal theory is strong and the sanc-
tion represents a drop in the bucket of the defendant’s total resources.”).  
 77.  See, e.g., Joe Carlson, 55 More Hospitals Settle in Kyphoplasty Overpayment Cases, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130702/NEWS/307029967.   
 78.  Lemos & Stein, supra note 66, at 12. 
 79.  Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 26, at 1748. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 1755. 
 83.  Id. 
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II.  OVERTREATMENT REGULATION 
Over the last decade, a noticeable new theory of health care 
fraud liability has emerged.  By linking the main cause of the health 
care cost crisis—overtreatment—with the severe penalties of the FCA, 
attorneys at the DOJ have prosecuted providers for administering too 
much health care by arguing the care administered was not medically 
necessary, and therefore, fraudulent. 
In order to review the DOJ’s overtreatment enforcement strategy 
in depth, it is worthwhile to first provide a brief definition of over-
treatment and an explanation of its causes; this follows immediately 
below.  To provide context, the recently proposed resolution of a ma-
jor overtreatment investigation involving cardiac services—the na-
tionwide implantable cardioverter defibrillator (“ICD”) investiga-
tion—will be presented as well.  This initiative provides an illustration 
of the potential dangers of overcriminalization and overenforcement 
within the DOJ’s chosen regulatory strategy of overtreatment. 
A.  America’s Overtreatment Problem 
America has an overtreatment problem.  Providers who “do too 
much” have become the norm in emergency rooms and family clinics 
across the United States due to a confluence of complex causes.  All 
actors are at least partially blameworthy, from the American patient—
who provides little resistance to cost increases due to insulating insur-
ance and moral hazard—to health care providers—who are both en-
couraged to intervene to increase profits and to protect themselves 
from malpractice liability and taught to operate in autonomous silos 
in which they do not communicate with other specialists—to hospi-
tals—who strive to fill all their beds and acquire more expensive and 
prestigious machinery in order to gain more market share.  The re-
sult: hospitals admit too many patients and American providers ad-
minister too many procedures that are too costly.  This is too often to 
the delight of the American “consumer-patient,”84 who does not mind 
                                                        
 84.  See Kristin L. Carman et al., Evidence That Consumers Are Skeptical About Evidence-
Based Health Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS, July 2010, at 1, 4, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2010/06/03/hlthaff.2009.0296.full.pdf+h
tml (sharing study results that found that thirty-three percent of survey respondents 
[American health care consumers] “agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 
‘medical treatments that work the best usually cost more than treatments that don’t work 
as well,’” and that, to the participants, “[t]he idea that getting high-quality care or the 
‘right’ care could mean getting less care was counterintuitive,” with one respondent not-
ing, “‘I don’t see how extra care can be harmful to your health.  Care would only benefit 
you.’”); see also David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, 
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an extra test or procedure in an effort to get a simple answer to a 
complex health concern.85 
The result can be called overtreatment.  Defined as care that is 
either too expensive, inefficient, unnecessary, or old fashioned, over-
treatment has become a major driver of skyrocketing health care 
spending.  According to health economists, up to one in every three dol-
lars spent annually on U.S. health care is wasted, and a substantial 
percentage of the waste is due to inefficient and unnecessary medical 
care.86  In a study released by the Institute of Medicine in 2011, which 
concluded that $765 billion is squandered annually, three categories 
combined to make up $530 billion, or 69%, of the total amount of 
annual wasted expenditures: (1) “[u]nnecessary [s]ervices” (includ-
ing the overuse of, often overpriced, services and the effect of 
“[d]efensive medicine”); (2) “[e]xcessive [a]dministrative [c]osts” 
(“[d]uplicative costs [for] . . . insurance” and “[u]nproductive docu-
mentation”); and (3) “[i]nefficiently [d]elivered [s]ervices” (includ-
ing “[m]edical errors[,] [u]ncoordinated care,” and “[i]nefficient 
operations”).87  Applying a more limited definition (“care that, ac-
cording to sound science and the patients’ own preferences, cannot 
possibly help them”), Donald Berwick and Andrew Hackbarth pegged 
the total amount that overtreatment costs American health care at 
                                                        
and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 547 (2001) (“Patients gener-
ally believe that ‘more is better’ when it comes to health care and perceive themselves to 
be the direct beneficiaries of their provider’s actions.”).  
In fact, insured Americans are normed to demand any test or treatment through di-
rect-to-consumer advertising and internet research.  See Barry R. Furrow, Doctors’ Dirty Little 
Secrets: The Dark Side of Medical Privacy, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 283 (1998); Martin L. Hirsch, Side 
Effects of Corporate Greed: Pharmaceutical Companies Need a Dose of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 607, 633 n.180 (2008) (“Direct-to-consumer advertising may en-
courage patients to pressure their physicians to prescribe specific medications.”); Carl E. 
Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 7, 11–13 (2009) (noting the trend toward consumerism in health care).  
 85.  See Lindsey Tanner, HCA Probe Shines Light on Chest Pain Overtreatment, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Aug. 8, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/hca-probe-shines-light-chest-pain-
overtreatment (“Patients often want the quicker fix, and Yale University cardiologist Har-
lan Krumholz says many patients mistakenly think elective angioplasties will do a better job 
of keeping them alive.”); see also BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 157—58 (raising the problem 
of demanding patients and physician acquiescence). 
 86.  See Debra Sherman, Stemming the Tide of Overtreatment in U.S. Healthcare, REUTERS 
(Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/us-overtreatment-
idUSTRE81F0UF20120216 (including MIT economist Jonathan Gruber’s estimated that 
the waste in health care approaches $800 billion); see also INST. OF MED., THE COST OF 
HEALTH CARE: HOW MUCH IS WASTE? 1 , 
http://iom.edu/Reports/2011/~/media/Files/widget/VSRT/healthcare-waste.swf (last 
accessed Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter THE COST OF HEALTH CARE]. 
 87.  See THE COST OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 86, at 3. 
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$158 to $226 billion annually.88  Whatever the total amount, the waste 
in the system undoubtedly threatens the long-term solvency of the 
federal health care programs, and in particular, Medicare. 
Reversal of this trend requires a reconstruction of the structure 
responsible for administering and delivering American health care 
and a reordering of incentives, something the ACA is purporting to 
spur.89  As scholars and providers have suggested, potential solutions 
could include: (1) replacing fee-for-service and even prospective-
payment systems with incentive-based, salaried compensation for pro-
viders,90 (2) a reduction of patients’ insensitivity to price through a 
system of direct cash payments to eliminate moral hazard,91 and (3) 
increased collaborative relationships between different providers—in 
accountable care organizations (“ACOs”), for example—in order to 
better coordinate care and eliminate duplication.92  Many ideas for 
reconstructing a new system have come from within the medical 
community itself.93 
Nevertheless, as health care costs have continued to grow, federal 
prosecutors have increased their focus on providers who, for various 
reasons, have allegedly administered overtreatment, and thus, accord-
ing to the DOJ, have committed health care fraud.  There is no doubt 
                                                        
 88.  Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care, 
307 JAMA 1513, 1514 (2012). 
 89.  See Daschle & Frist, supra note 8. 
 90.  See Editorial Board, Fee-For-Service Rewards Volume: Our View, USA TODAY (July 7, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/07/07/fee-for-service-unnecessary-
surgeries-editorials-debates/2497213/. 
 91.  See Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the 
Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 939–40 (2013) (presenting a proposal that 
forces patients to be sensitive to the price of health care they incur). 
 92.  Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/aco/. 
 93.  See, e.g., CHOOSING WISELY: AN INITIATIVE OF THE ABIM FOUNDATION (2014), 
http://www.choosingwisely.org/about-us/ (“Choosing Wisely aims to promote conversations 
between providers and patients by helping patients choose care that is: [s]upported by ev-
idence; [n]ot duplicative of other tests or procedures already received; [f]ree from harm; 
[and] [t]ruly necessary.”);  Bruce Japsen, Doctors Call out 90 More Unnecessary Medical Tests, 
Procedures, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2013/02/21/doctors-call-out-90-more-
unnecessary-medical-tests-procedures/ (last accessed Aug. 15, 2013); cf. Rita Redberg, 
Commentary, Less Is More, INST. MED. (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Perspectives-Files/2012/Commentaries/VSRT%20-
%20Less%20Is%20More.pdf (“There is increasing recognition among physicians that 
many of [their] patients are receiving too much health care.  In a recent survey of primary 
care physicians identified by the American Medical Association (AMA) masterfile, 42 per-
cent said that patients in their own practices were getting too much care.”). 
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that some overtreatment is fraudulently administered, but some over-
treatment results from the divergence between clinical decision-
making and government or insurance-created standards.  Realizing 
the cost to the system of administering “too much care” and the ab-
sence of other pressures on providers to limit cost,94 the DOJ has 
sought to regulate providers engaged in overtreatment by using the 
federal government’s most powerful anti-fraud tools.  Consequently, 
in overtreatment cases, whether or not the provider violated the FCA 
is often determined by whether or not the care administered was 
medically necessary.  Under this approach, solely by virtue of its ex-
cess, overtreatment is fraud. 
B.  The Nationwide Overtreatment Investigation: ICD Update 
In early 2011, the DOJ began a nationwide review of the surgeries 
placing ICDs due to a suspicion that many of the expensive devices’ 
implantations were not medically necessary.95  Medicare pays for the 
procedure, which is designed to prevent sudden cardiac death by 
regulating and correcting heartbeats of high-risk patients that are sus-
ceptible to irregularities and arrhythmias.96  Even though Medicare 
covers the procedure, it places limits on the type of ICD placement it 
covers through a national coverage determination (“NCD”).  One of 
the relevant NCD limitations for ICD placement regards timing: pur-
suant to this limitation, Medicare will cover only ICDs that are im-
planted more than forty days after an acute myocardial infraction, 
and outside of ninety days after a percutaneous coronary intervention 
(coronary angioplasty) or coronary artery bypass graph (“CABG”).97 
After becoming aware that some ICDs were being placed outside 
the bounds of these Medicare NCD timing requirements, the DOJ 
                                                        
 94.  See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 
GEO. L.J. 519 (2013) (noting how Medicare’s history and structure prevent it from improv-
ing quality and limiting cost). 
 95.  See Joe Carlson, Cardiac Arrests: Hospitals Anxious They Could Face Hefty False Claims 
Penalties in Implanted Cardiac Defibrillator Cases, MODERN HEALTHCARE (July 21, 2012), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20120721/MAGAZINE/307219994. 
 96.  See id.; What Is an Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator?, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH: 
NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/icd/ (“[An ICD] is a small device 
that’s placed in the chest or abdomen . . . to help treat irregular heartbeats called ar-
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 97.  See David Mann, Medicare ICD Guidelines Exegesis, EP STUDIOS (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.epstudiossoftware.com/?p=812.  For a complete discussion of the ICD cover-
age determination by Medicare, see Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Deci-
sions, Transparency and Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 25–30 (2010). 
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began to look at when, specifically, providers placed ICDs in the 
chests of high-risk patients.  The review focused particularly on the 
exact number of days between an adverse cardiac event and the ICD 
placements.98  Based on the DOJ’s chosen strategy in other overtreat-
ment investigations, it appeared that the DOJ would submit that ICD 
placements outside Medicare’s approved timeframe would be pre-
sumptively fraudulent and violative of the FCA.  Providers and advo-
cacy groups were worried about this newest DOJ initiative, and the 
concern centered on the fact that “the DOJ’s focus [was] not on med-
ical necessity,” but rather “on compliance with the national coverage poli-
cy.”99 
As the investigation continued, a number of institutions landed 
under the DOJ’s microscope, including the world-renowned Cleve-
land Clinic, for placing ICDs in the chests or abdomens of individuals 
too close to adverse cardiac events, and out of compliance with the 
Medicare NCD.  Nevertheless, implicated clinicians defended their 
actions, arguing that the ICD placements at issue—specifically those 
placed outside NCD timing requirements—were medically appropri-
ate and clinically necessary.  The investigation has become a proxy for 
the larger modern medical-legal conflict, with federal prosecutors 
seeking to enforce a practice standard and draw a bright-line by in-
voking broad anti-fraud statutes, and providers arguing the individual-
ity of each patient, the murkiness of medical necessity, and the im-
portance of clinical autonomy. 
Providers and practitioners argued that the DOJ’s ICD initia-
tive—and its chosen strategy—was illegitimate.  Some noted that regu-
lating ICD placement in this way was “based on a flawed legal prem-
ise.”100  Indeed, they argued, “the [Medicare] NCD describe[d] 
circumstances in which an ICD implantation [was] covered, but [did] 
not exclude coverage in other circumstances.”101  As such, placing an 
ICD outside the Medicare NCD was not presumptively unnecessary, 
and definitely not presumptively fraudulent, according to the lan-
                                                        
 98.  See Buck, supra note 9, at 491–94. 
 99.  See Lessons from the Department of Justice’s Investigation of ICD Implants, THE SOC’Y FOR 
CARDIOVASCULAR ANGIOGRAPHY AND INTERVENTIONS (Sept. 7, 2012), 
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guage of the relevant NCD itself.102  Others argued that “the govern-
ment’s expansive investigation into ICD procedures [was] notable be-
cause it turn[ed] in large part on whether the application of the 
NCD . . . [was] the sole proper basis for determining whether a medi-
cal procedure [was] necessary.”103  This was particularly concerning, 
given the ambiguous, incomplete, and outdated NCD, according to 
providers.104  This ambiguity was compounded by the fact that the 
American College of Cardiology Foundation, in conjunction with pro-
fessional non-profit group Heart Rhythm Society (“HRS”), had devel-
oped appropriate use criteria (“AUC”) to guide providers on appro-
priate ICD placement that, unfortunately, clearly conflicted with the 
Medicare NCD.105  According to practitioners, this “place[d physi-
cians] in the difficult dilemma of trying to do the ‘right thing’ for 
their patients, while recognizing that the ‘right thing’ may not be cov-
ered by the payer or insurer.”106  Even more, this “right thing” may 
subject the provider to a fraud investigation—and, in fact, it did. 
After beginning the investigation, the DOJ reached out to HRS in 
January 2011 “to assist in an advisory role to lend expertise concern-
ing proper guidelines for clinical decision making.”107  According to 
commentators, the DOJ’s contact with HRS showed something note-
worthy from the DOJ—specifically that it would be “extremely unlike-
ly that the DOJ, with the assistance of HRS [would be] investigating 
or . . . likely to prosecute the occasional or even moderately frequent 
use of ‘reasonable’ off-guidelines cases.”108  Still, members of HRS 
noted the “palpable fear in [their] community” and “expressed con-
                                                        
 102.  Id. (noting that “determining Medicare coverage for patients who are outside the 
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Investigation. 
 108.  Larry Husten, Heart Rhythm Society Advising DOJ in Investigation of ICD Implants, 
CARDIOBRIEF (Jan. 21, 2011), http://cardiobrief.org/2011/01/21/heart-rhythm-society-
advising-doj-in-investigation-of-icd-implants. 
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cern that the investigation would have an overall negative impact on 
public health.”109 
More than eighteen months later, in August of 2012, the DOJ 
began “e-mailing hospitals across the country . . . with instructions to 
examine questionable implantable defibrillator surgeries on Medicare 
patients and estimate potential penalties under the False Claims 
Act.”110  The DOJ also published a “Resolution Model” document that 
has since served as the basis for settlement with investigated providers.  
The Resolution Model document uses clinical and reimbursement 
standards to distinguish between FCA violations and non-fraudulent 
“technical” violations,111 with which the DOJ does not seem con-
cerned. 
This Resolution Model provides six different classes of cases with 
six respective dispositions.  Most dispositions either push for (1) ex-
cluding the class from enforcement, (2) assessing damages to varying 
degrees, and/or (3) seeking settlement.112  For four of the six classes 
of cases, the DOJ has proposed assessing damages, and one of the 
classes has been excluded from the enforcement initiative altogether.  
For the remaining class of cases (called the “No Enforcement Catego-
ries”), the DOJ has proposed that no damages be sought.113  For these 
providers, the DOJ has noted that ICD implants were “potentially vio-
lative of NCD time frames (or waiting periods),” but has said it will 
not enforce a penalty against these cases “pursuant to DOJ discretion 
in False Claims Act enforcement.”114  This final class, the class of No 
Enforcement Categories, includes so-called “technical” violations, 
which are defined as cases that feature facts that demonstrate that 
                                                        
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Joe Carlson, Feds Notify Hospitals of Liability for Wrongly Implanted Heart Devices, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20120830/NEWS/308309943. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ICD INVESTIGATION MEDICAL REVIEW 
GUIDELINES/RESOLUTION MODEL 1–3 (Aug. 2012), available at 
http://www.cardiosource.org/News-Media/Publications/Cardiology-
Magazine/~/media/Files/Advocacy/DOJ%20ICD%20selfresolution%20model.ashx 
[hereinafter RESOLUTION MODEL] (listing the six categories: (1) “Covered by the NCD 
and/or Excluded from this Investigation,” (2) “DOJ No Enforcement Categories,” (3) 
“DOJ Category—With Enforcement,” (4) “Coding Error (Without Repeating Patterns),” 
(5) “Not Covered by NCD or DOJ Categories,” (6) “Not Medically Indicated”); see also Lar-
ry Husten, ICD Investigation: DOJ Sends Resolution Model to Hospitals, CARDIOBRIEF (Aug. 30, 
2012), http://cardiobrief.org/2012/08/30/icd-investigation-doj-sends-resolution-model-
to-hospitals/.   
 113.  RESOLUTION MODEL, supra note 112, at 2. 
 114.  Id. at 7. 
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“although the ICD was otherwise indicated, it technically violated the 
NCD because it was implanted near the end of—but still during—
the . . . prohibited time frames.”115 
By the DOJ’s stance, it is indicating that it will not pursue the 
cases in which the provider did violate the Medicare NCD, but the 
ICD was otherwise medically necessary.  This means that no health 
fraud prosecution will be maintained against many providers who 
placed the ICD outside of the Medicare NCD.  Interestingly, the DOJ 
has referenced its discretion in deciding not to pursue these provid-
ers, seemingly implying that a technical violation (a violation of Medi-
care’s timing guidelines) is legally different from an unreasonable or 
harmful deviation (for which settlement will be sought).  The DOJ’s 
decision not to pursue these providers may indicate that the NCD may 
be inaccurate or at least that the payment standard policy differed 
from the quickly developing clinical standard of care.  What is surpris-
ing to many providers is that the DOJ is not seeking settlement with 
these providers who committed a “technical” violation. 
Oddly, going forward, providers are explicitly told to heed the 
Medicare NCD in providing treatment to beneficiaries.  The DOJ was 
clear to note that the “Resolution Model is not CMS policy” and “does 
not replace, update or interpret NCD 20.4 [the NCD at issue] and 
should not be relied upon or utilized in any manner to determine 
whether an ICD is payable by Medicare.”116  As of early 2014, the DOJ 
has not publicly stated why the ICD investigation was initially 
launched,117 nor has the DOJ answered some of the more prickly 
questions addressing the Resolution Model, in particular whether the 
DOJ will require Corporate Integrity Agreements with the resulting 
settlements. 
Within the Resolution Model, the DOJ also notes that “multipli-
ers”—the ability of the DOJ to assess up to treble damages for viola-
tions of the FCA—“will be determined during discussions with each 
facility and will be based upon many factors, including, but not lim-
ited to . . . patient harm, patterns, compliance efforts and effective-
                                                        
 115.  Id. at 9. 
 116.  Id. at 1; see also Feldman, supra note 103 (explaining that the Resolution Model 
“does not . . . clarify how hospitals should handle Medicare coverage claims for ICD im-
plantation procedures going forward”). 
 117.  Jesse A. Witten, What’s New in Hospital Fraud and Abuse?, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS 
ASS’N (Sept. 29, 2013), 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/FC13/VI_witten.
pdf. 
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ness . . . and knowledge evidence.”118  In effect, the DOJ is seeking to 
apply a higher statutory penalty to cases in which “knowledge evi-
dence”—evidence that the provider was knowingly committing health 
care fraud—exists, as well as to cases in which patient harm occurred.  
Quite clearly, the DOJ is fashioning its own individualized remedy for 
a number of providers, given its wide discretion to do so under the 
FCA. 
The HRS has since responded with a statement that expressed 
hope but also disappointment.  Noting that HRS made the “difficult 
decision to work with the DOJ to protect patient access to life saving 
therapies, and to ensure that the federal government was aware of 
and considered evidence-based medicine and the realities of clinical 
practice during their investigation,” the HRS noted that, in creating 
the enforcement categories, “in some circumstances our counsel was 
not accepted, and we are troubled by some aspects of the final deci-
sion.”119  It further noted that a future priority will be to address the 
“misalignment between the Medicare NCD and the ACC/AHA/HRS 
guidelines” in an effort to “align payment policy with evidence-based 
medicine.”120 
Sympathetic bloggers have noted that, by virtue of this enforce-
ment model, doctors are “rendered powerless” through the DOJ’s 
“new secretive rule-making approach.”121  Others have asked how the 
DOJ can “justify the use of multipliers in the resolution model” if “a 
hospital lacks the scienter for violation of the FCA.”122  Finally, others 
have noted that “using the NCD criteria as the sole determinant of 
medical necessity without accounting for on-site clinical decision mak-
ing leads to inaccurate conclusions, and that the NCD, which was is-
sued in 2005, does not reflect current clinical guidance or recent ad-
vances in medical knowledge.”123  Nevertheless, the first settlement 
was announced in September 2013 when MedCath Corporation 
                                                        
 118.  RESOLUTION MODEL, supra note 112, at 2 n.2. 
 119.  Westby G. Fisher, DOJ Hands Heart Rhythm Society and Hospitals Its Decision on Defib-
rillators, DR. WES BLOG (Sept. 4, 2012), http://drwes.blogspot.com/2012/09/doj-hands-
heart-rhythm-society-and.html. 
 120.  Id.   
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Bradley M. Smyer, New Developments in the Department of Justice’s National ICD Investi-
gation, COMPLIANCE TODAY, Feb. 2013, at 43, 45, available at http://www.hcca-
info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/Compliance_Today/0213/CT_0213_Smyer.pdf. 
 123.  Feldman, supra note 103. 
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agreed to pay $6.1 million to settle claims resulting from ICD place-
ments at six of its former hospitals.124 
The DOJ’s decision to exempt technical violations from damage 
assessments is quite notable, however, even if the proposed penalty 
structure vis-a-vis each provider is quite vague.  Perhaps this is a result 
of consultation with a clinically expert party (HRS), or a realization 
that striving for settlement with those providers would be a clear ex-
ample of using the FCA to enforce a reimbursement standard—a us-
age even broader than the questionable practice of using the FCA to 
resolve “allegations of regulatory noncompliance.”125  This decision 
not to pursue the providers who placed ICDs outside the Medicare 
NCD was not a trivial one, nor was it expected, given the breadth of 
the statute and the wide application seen in previous DOJ initiatives 
that stretched nationwide.126  As commentators have noted, this seems 
to indicate that “the DOJ appears to have shown some appreciation 
for the notion that determining medical necessity is not always as 
simple as mechanically applying the NCD criteria.”127 
Whether this is a sign of a new restrained enforcement strategy 
remains to be seen.  The DOJ’s decision to consult the HRS has major 
effects on clinical practice; procedurally, there is no requirement for 
regulators to consult with disinterested clinical experts.  Still, the 
number of “innocent” providers who were ensnared in the initial in-
vestigation and the fact that the DOJ has been able to push for indi-
vidualized penalties demonstrates that the initiative still suffers from 
many of the defects of overenforcement.  This will be investigated 
more fully below. 
III.  THE “POTENTIALLY CRIPPLING”128 STATUTE 
The vastness of liability that characterizes the FCA has been well 
documented,129 and this article will not delve deeply into the history 
                                                        
 124.  See Department of Justice ICD Investigation Update: First Settlement Announced, DRINKER 
BIDDLE (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/resources/publications/2013/Department-of-Justice-ICD-
Investigation-Update-First-Settlement-Announced-. 
 125.  See Joan H. Krause, Ethical Lawyering in the Gray Areas: Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 
34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 121, 122 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
 126.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 127.  See Feldman, supra note 103. 
 128.  See generally John T. Boese, When Angry Patients Become Angry Prosecutors: Medical Ne-
cessity Determinations, Quality of Care and the Qui Tam Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53 (1999). 
 129.  See, e.g., Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: 
Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. 
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of the Act.  Clearly, since the modern FCA came into being—typically 
pegged as when the 1986 amendments to the Act took effect—it has 
left an indelible mark on the medical profession, and, unforgettably, 
on a number of medical professionals.  That it justifiably applies to 
prevent the scourge of fraud and abuse within the health care system 
has been a truism nearly unanimously held by those in the halls of 
Congress.130 
Its specific provisions are well known.  The statute is a civil law, 
with a standard requiring only a “preponderance of the evidence” for 
liability and sheltering it from a number of criminal law’s defendant-
focused protections.  Its intent standard, “knowingly,” is explicitly de-
fined as “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard,”131 and some 
courts have defined it as requiring only a “negligence-plus” mens 
rea.132  Its qui tam provisions deputize private citizens,133 giving the 
DOJ access to typically confidential key facts. 
Recent changes have made it more potent.  Since the passage of 
the ACA, a violation of the anti-kickback statute (“AKS”)134 is explicitly 
a false claim for purposes of FCA liability, no matter the challenges 
associated with proof.135  The so-called public disclosure bar, which 
prevented opportunistic relators from bringing lawsuits based upon 
information that had already been previously publicly disclosed, has 
                                                        
LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 92 (1999) (referring to the FCA as “draconian”); Sarah Helene Duggin, 
The Impact of the War over the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege on the Business of American 
Health Care, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301, 335–36 n.172 (2006) (“The False 
Claims Act, a statute dating back to the post-Civil War era, is among the most draconian of 
these measures. . . . Federal authorities frequently use the statute as a sword.”); Christo-
pher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied Certification Theory of 
Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 227, 235 (2013) (“In practice, damag-
es under the False Claims Act vastly exceed those available under other civil actions.”).   
 130.  See supra note 37. 
 131.  31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2012).  
 132.  See United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942–43 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding the 
scienter requirement of gross negligence “plus” and noting that “as the statute explicitly 
states that specific intent is not required, it is logical to conclude that reckless disregard in 
this context is not a ‘lesser form of intent,’ but an extreme version of ordinary negli-
gence”) (citation omitted); Crane Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. United States, 45 410, 433 n.26 
(Fed. Cl. 1999) (“[U]nder the False Claims Act, reckless disregard may be considered the 
equivalent of ‘aggravated form of gross negligence, or gross negligence-plus.’”). 
 133.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
 134.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012). 
 135.  See John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False 
Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1999).  On a related note, it 
remains unclear whether the AKS requires any type of criminal intent following the ACA 
amendments.  See Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Toward a Specific Intent Requirement in White Collar 
Crime Statutes: How the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Sheds Light on the “Gen-
eral Intent Revolution,” 64 FLA. L. REV. 449 (2012).  
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been narrowed.136  In fact, the submission of a claim—once a neces-
sary showing for FCA liability—is no longer required; retention of an 
overpayment by a provider or health care entity can now provide a ba-
sis for an FCA violation.137 
When wielded against individuals who intentionally defraud the 
government, the FCA is a productive and powerful tool, but when the 
federal government stretches the statute to apply to health care pro-
viders who have allegedly engaged in overtreatment, the regulatory 
regime risks becoming imprecise due to its broad reach and blunt 
application.  Two particular FCA provisions contribute to the broad 
nature of the statute: (1) the relatively low intent requirement and (2) 
the substantial statutorily-mandated penalties.  The two provisions 
work to cast a wide net for potential violators and to impose heavy 
penalties against providers who are ensnared in that net. 
A.  The Intent Requirement 
Unlike other health care fraud statutes,138 the FCA specifically de-
fines its intent requirement within its provisions.139  In order to estab-
lish liability, the FCA requires the provider to act “knowingly,” which 
is defined as having “actual knowledge,”140 as “act[ing] in deliberate 
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,”141 or as “act[ing] 
in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”142  Be-
yond the “recklessness” mens rea required by the statute, Congress 
and some courts made the FCA’s intent standard elastic by referring 
to the required intent standard as “gross negligence ‘plus.’”143 
                                                        
 136.  See Tabb, supra note 37. 
 137.  Compare 31 § U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(F) (2012), with id. § 3729(b)(3).  
 138.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012) (requiring that the individual “know[]” a claim to 
be “false, fictitious, or fraudulent,” but providing no guidance); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012) 
(uses “knowingly” and “willfully” but does not define the terms).   
 139.  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)–(b). 
 140.  Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 141.  Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 142.  Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
 143.  Some courts have noted that something approaching gross negligence “plus” must 
be demonstrated to show the requisite intent.  See United States ex rel. Williams v. Renal 
Care Grp., Inc., 696 F.3d 518, 530 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing the congressional report describ-
ing the intent standard as requiring the individual “to make such inquiry as would be rea-
sonable and prudent to conduct under the circumstances. . . . Only those who act in ‘gross 
negligence’ of this duty will be found liable under the False Claims Act.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Miller v. United States, 550 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (holding “ex-
treme negligence” as sufficing for FCA liability); United States v. Massenburg, No. Civ. A. 
2:03-0437, 2004 WL 2370694, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 21, 2004) (“The government may well 
prove at trial that this negligence was actually the ‘gross negligence-plus’ standard that the 
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As the DOJ has used the FCA against health care providers, this 
intent standard has offered little protection for providers who, while 
not “knowing” that they were filing a false claim with the government, 
made a negligent decision that related to the filing of a claim with the 
federal government.  For example, in a recent investigation, the DOJ 
has alleged FCA liability for providers who wrongly (according to the 
federal government) admitted patients for a relatively new surgery 
and accurately billed Medicare for that inpatient surgery.144  This ex-
panding intent standard has mirrored generally widening liability for 
health care entities, including a recent high-profile FCA case against a 
medical device company in which the false claims were filed by hospi-
tals that were unaware of the fact that the bills were for care adminis-
tered in violation of the AKS (the administering physicians were the 
only actors aware).145  There, the First Circuit made clear that the 
submitting party need not have any fraudulent intent in order to 
maintain an FCA claim against an actor who caused the false claim to 
be presented.146 
Given the reduced proof of intent required for FCA liability, in-
dividuals who make negligent mistakes could be liable under the FCA.  
Further, the federal government has a powerful argument when it al-
leges that any billing error to the federal health care programs is at 
least grossly negligent because the billing regulations are undoubtedly 
                                                        
False Claims Act is designed to deter.”).  But see United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 
635 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[F]raud is actionable under the False Claims Act, while 
negligent errors are not.”); Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System 
Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1053 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is important to remember that the stand-
ard for liability is knowing, not negligent, presentation of a false claim.”); United States ex 
rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 876, 888 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) 
(“simple negligence and innocent mistakes, however, do not rise to [the] level of scienter” 
required by the FCA.”). 
 144.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 145.  See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir. 
2011). 
 146.  The hospital that was unaware of the physicians’ illegal actions could only arguably 
be negligent, in that it was not, but should have been, aware that the physicians were vio-
lating the AKS.  See id. 
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complex.147  When the federal government is swinging this hammer, 
“everything looks like a nail.”148 
B.  The Penalty Provisions 
No provision in health care fraud regulation is more potent than 
the FCA’s penalty structure.  The Act explicitly requires application of a 
minimal fine of $5,000 and a maximum penalty of $10,000 per claim 
(adjusted to $5,500 and $11,000 according to the FCA primer), in ad-
dition to an award of three times the amount of financial harm suf-
fered by the federal government.149  Because it is set by statute, a 
handful of district courts have found that instituting at least the min-
imum penalty amount is non-discretionary.150  Further, as is clear 
from the statutory language, this damage amount applies to each 
claim—meaning a provider is penalized for each billed service adminis-
tered.151 
The Act is unique in that the penalty provision explicitly provides 
a minimum amount a court must award—instead of, for example, 
                                                        
 147.  See Rehabilitation Ass’n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 
1994) (“There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in question, involving 
the financing of Medicare and Medicaid, are among the most completely impenetrable 
texts within human experience.  Indeed, one approaches them at the level of specificity 
herein demanded with dread, for not only are they dense reading of the most tortuous 
kind, but Congress also revisits the area frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the 
process and making any solid grasp of the matters addressed merely a passing phase.”). 
 148.  See Larkin, supra note 14, at 740 (noting that narrowly chartered agencies enforc-
ing rules may attempt to overstate the importance of their investigations, stating “[i]f the 
only tool that one has to use is a hammer, everything looks like a nail”). 
 149.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A 
PRIMER, http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf. 
 150.  See United States ex rel. Lamberts v. Stokes, 640 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (W.D. Mich. 
2009) (noting that “[a] district court has ‘considerable discretion’ in determining the 
amount of a penalty,” but mentioning that “the Court must impose a penalty ranging from 
a minimum of $5,500 to a maximum of $11,000 per violation”); United States v. Cabrera-
Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242 (D.P.R. 2000) (“The legislative history of the 1986 amend-
ments makes clear that civil penalties are ‘automatic and mandatory for each claim which 
is false.’  Thus, up to a certain point, the number of civil penalties, or whether to even as-
sess civil penalties, is not discretionary.  ‘This forfeiture provision is mandatory; it leaves 
the trial court without discretion to alter the statutory amount.’” (citation omitted) (quot-
ing United States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 286 (7th Cir. 1978))); United States v. Bottini, 
19 F. Supp. 2d 632, 641 (W.D. La. 1997) (noting that “[t]he court has the discretion to as-
sess a civil penalty as to each of the two claims found to be false and fraudulent at an 
amount between $5,000.00 and $10,000.00” [the old statutory amount]); United States v. 
Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. 1011, 1018 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (“[T]he Court rules that it 
lacks the discretion or inherent power under the FCA to award damages below the range 
set forth therein.”).  
 151.  See Krause, supra note 16, at 125. 
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providing that courts fashion any penalty amount up to a maximum of 
$11,000.152  Not only do those found in violation of the FCA have to 
pay a large fine, but they are also subject to the administrative penalty 
of exclusion through the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”), in which the HHS Secretary can ban them from contracting 
with the federal government for a set period of time—and sometimes 
permanently.153 
Although the statute does provide for the recovery of treble 
damages of financial harm suffered by the federal government, the 
majority of statutorily imposed FCA penalties will often arise out of 
the mandated per-claim penalty.154  Measuring the majority of the 
penalties based upon how many claims providers file—as opposed to 
primarily linking the penalty to the magnitude or substance of the 
overall harm suffered by the federal government (that is, taxpayers), 
or even suffered by patients themselves—provides the potential for 
seemingly disordered results.155  As the FCA does not require that the 
government prove tangible harm in order to demonstrate the exist-
ence of actual damages, the statute’s elasticity opens it up for use in 
different types of scenarios. 
This penalty structure—initially erected in order to deter de-
fendants from selling defective military goods in which the sale oc-
curred either in bulk or for a few deliveries of a large amount of 
goods156—may be susceptible to distortion when applied to the health 
care industry because the average American provider treats thousands 
of patients and, as a result, files thousands and thousands of claims 
with the federal government annually.157  The theoretical potential for 
                                                        
 152.  See supra note 150.   
 153.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2012) (including mandatory and permissible exclusion). 
 154.  See Krause, supra note 16, at 143–44 (noting that, in the famous case of George 
Krizek, the U.S. sought $81 million in total damages (largely due to the statutory penalty) 
after Medicare overpaid Mr. Krizek a comparatively meager $245,000). 
 155.  See id., at 144 (“Thus, in the health care context, FCA liability is greater for provid-
ers who submit the largest number of claims, even if those claims result in relatively little 
financial harm to the government.”); see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty 
Co., Inc., 840 F. Supp. 71, 74–75 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding the penalty “extremely harsh 
and unjust” and awarding $35,000 where actual government damages totaled $1,630 and 
FCA civil penalties totaled $290,000—a ratio of 1:178). 
 156.  See Pamela Bucy et. al., State, Statutes, and Fraud: A Study of Emerging State Efforts to 
Combat White Collar Crime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2010) (noting that “the FCA 
provided the federal government with a way to deal with deliveries of defective or nonex-
istent military supplies to the Union Army”). 
 157.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., INNOVATORS’ GUIDE TO NAVIGATING 
MEDICARE, VERSION 2.0,  at 3 (2010), 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/CouncilonTechInnov/downloads/InnovatorsG
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astronomical statutorily mandated penalties becomes a real possibil-
ity.  Clearly, as the provider sees more patients, the potential FCA fine 
grows. 
In order to illustrate the potential disorder of this regulatory 
framework, four examples of the anomalous results and a summary 
table follow below. 
Example 1: First, ten doctors in a clinic administer a procedure 
to 10,000 patients in a given year.  The physicians defer to a company 
that sold them EMR software as to what the billing code should be for 
this procedure; as a result, all ten wrongly bill Medicare after using an 
incorrect code for the procedure.  Coding the procedure in the in-
correct way causes Medicare to overpay $10 per procedure.  These 
mistakes would subject the clinic to an FCA fine of $55.3 million to 
$110.3 million.158 
Example 2: Second, in a classic example of the federal govern-
ment’s strategy of policing overtreatment, these same ten doctors ad-
minister a new and clinically advanced procedure for 10,000 patients 
in a given year.  Even though Medicare has not explicitly endorsed 
this type of procedure in its NCD, some practitioners nationwide pro-
vide the procedure, because it is likely in the best medical interest of 
the patients according to the practitioners’ clinical expertise, and 
Medicare will immediately pay for the procedure.  Further, according 
to the settling hospitals, Medicare has implicitly endorsed performing 
the procedure on an inpatient basis, and patients with private insur-
ance receive the procedure with little pushback from insurance com-
panies.159  Still, by providing the procedure against the explicit guid-
ance of Medicare’s NCD—and then billing Medicare for the 
procedure—the physicians open themselves up to serious FCA liabil-
ity. 
A $55 million to $110 million penalty amount could be sought 
against the providers, added to any financial damage the federal gov-
ernment suffered due to the procedure (this would be the cost of the 
procedure, multiplied by 10,000 patients, multiplied by three).  With 
a hypothetical reimbursement amount of $15,000 per procedure, the 
                                                        
uide5_10_10.pdf (noting that Medicare’s budget is $460 billion annually); Peter Roskam, 
Medicare Needs a Digital Elliot Ness, HUFF POST: THE BLOG (June 22, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-roskam/medicare-needs-a-digital_b_620759.html 
(noting that Medicare processes $460 billion in claims each year).  
 158.  This total penalty amount is the product of 10,000 and $5,500 to $11,000 added to 
the product of 10,000 (claims), three (trebled damages), and $10 (damage sustained per 
procedure). 
 159.  See, e.g., Buck, supra note 9, at 504. 
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total FCA liability would approach $505 to $560 million.  Notably, this 
liability total holds even where the procedure was medically necessary 
according to the treating physician, administered in a clinically sound 
manner, and resulted in successful clinical outcomes for all patients.  
Even more interestingly, if the procedure was not medically necessary, 
not administered in a clinically sound manner, and did not result in a 
successful clinical outcome, the total FCA liability would be the exact 
same amount. 
Example 3: Third, a similar ten-doctor clinic treats the same 
10,000 patients in a given year.  However, this clinic engages in a 
fraudulent scheme called “upcoding” in which physicians intentional-
ly bill Medicare for a more expensive procedure than the one they 
administer.  Specifically, the clinic’s physicians complete the proce-
dure on an outpatient basis, but bill Medicare as if it were performed 
as an inpatient procedure.  Because of the miscoding, Medicare pays 
for an inpatient clinic stay, overpaying by a hypothetical $1,000 per 
procedure.  Under the FCA, the federal government would be eligible 
to seek between $85 million and $140 million in this scenario.160 
Example 4: Finally, a ten-doctor clinic notices that the meager 
10,000 patients to whom they administer a certain procedure in a giv-
en year are not enough to support their lavish lifestyles.  They agree 
to fabricate the names of 1,000 more patients and bill Medicare under 
false social security numbers for a procedure costing $15,000.  These 
physicians would be subject to a $50.5 million to $56 million penalty 
under the FCA.161 
  
                                                        
 160.  This total is reached by multiplying the damage sustained by the federal govern-
ment by three, and then by 10,000 (for each claim), totaling $30 million.  The FCA’s man-
datory penalty is $5,500 to $11,000.  Multiplying this range by the amount of claims 
(10,000) totals $55 million to $110 million.  When added to the first total, the penalty falls 
between $85 million and $140 million. 
 161.  This total is first reached by calculating treble damages (1,000 patients multiplied 
by $15,000 and three), which totals $45 million.  This is added to the statutory penalty of 
1,000 multiplied by $5,500 to $11,000, which totals $5.5 million to $11 million.  The sum 
of these products is $50.5 million to $56 million.  
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GRAPH 1 
Scenario Financial Harm 
Based Upon 
Medically-
Illegitimate Care162 
Intentional 
Fraudulent 
Scheme 
Patients 
Affected 
Median 
Total FCA 
Liability  
(in millions) 
Example 1 $100,000 No 10,000 $82.8 
Example 2 $0 No 10,000 $532.5 
Example 3 $10 million Yes 10,000 $112.5 
Example 4 $15 million Yes 1,000 $53.3 
C.  Damages Calculations   
 The four examples demonstrate the potentially idiosyncratic na-
ture of the FCA penalty calculation.  The two arguably “worst” cases—
scenarios in which physicians engage in an intentional fraudulent 
scheme and allow profits to color their clinical decision-making—
would result in the second- and fourth-highest FCA liability, respec-
tively.  The scenario that features the most financial harm to Medicare 
results in the lowest FCA liability amount.  The one scenario in which 
the physicians seemingly do not bill Medicare for any unnecessary 
medical services is the scenario with a liability amount exceeding half 
of one billion dollars—outpacing all other scenarios’ totals by more 
than $400 million. 
Generally, these examples demonstrate how dependent the dam-
ages calculation is on the number of total claims (the fewest number of 
patients affected garnered the lowest FCA liability amount), and not 
on the magnitude or totality of the harm inflicted, nor the brazenness 
of a particular provider’s acts.  The FCA statute does not mandate 
multiplying damages for egregious breaches of the physicians’ duty to 
their patients or even patient harm, nor is it affected by large amounts 
of financial harm suffered by the federal health care programs.  At 
bottom, how false the “technical falsity” is does not matter, nor does it 
matter how socially harmful a provider’s behavior is.  A comparatively 
“innocent” and “cheaper” (per claim) mistake may carry enormous 
legal liability, whereas a relatively expensive and blatantly fraudulent 
scheme may carry less. 
These observations demonstrate the potential for distortion of 
the current penalty structure—the statute itself lacks aggravating fac-
                                                        
 162.  For purposes of this analysis, “harm based upon medically illegitimate care” is de-
fined as dollars that Medicare paid that it should not have. 
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tors for egregious behavior and/or substantial patient harm and lacks 
mitigating factors when those factors are absent.163  And where the 
FCA provides for a broad range of potential penalties, federal prose-
cutors are emboldened to choose both the targets of health care 
fraud investigations and the proposed penalty amount with little 
structural limitation.  This opportunity for federal prosecutors opens 
the door to application of the statute to all kinds of clinical scenarios, 
including the costly problem of overtreatment. 
IV.  THE DISORDERING THREATS 
Fourteen years ago, Professor Pamela Bucy noted that an “ag-
gressive law enforcement machine” was “poised to pursue health care 
fraud,” armed with “weapons” that could “demolish a health care pro-
vider.”164  And since that prophetic statement, health care fraud en-
forcement has ballooned, with the DOJ setting new annual records 
for fraud recoveries, individuals prosecuted, and cases closed on near-
ly an annual basis.165  The application of the fraud statutes—and in 
particular, the FCA—has continued to grow into the 21st century, and 
will continue to do so under the ACA.166 
Two particular characteristics of the regime—addressing both 
the procedure and the substance of the regulation of overtreatment—
complicate the enforcement framework.  First, procedurally, the ef-
fect of settlement-made law injects inconsistency into the regulation 
of overtreatment regulation, resulting in limited (if any) precedent.  
Second, the showings of harm and intent, factors traditionally separat-
ing the culpable from the innocent in other legal regimes, have lim-
ited effect in the regulation of overtreatment.  Both types of charac-
teristics—those related to settlement-made law and those related to 
the substantive underlying misconduct within overtreatment—are ex-
plained below. 
                                                        
 163.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 164.  Pamela Bucy, The Path from Regulator to Hunter, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3, 40 (2000). 
 165.  See TRAC REPORTS, supra note 11; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Result in Record-Breaking 
Recoveries Totaling Nearly $4.1 Billion (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/02/20120214a.html. 
 166.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Departments of Justice and Health and Hu-
man Services Announce Record-Breaking Recoveries Resulting from Joint Efforts to Com-
bat Health Care Fraud (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/February/14-ag-206.html. 
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A.  The Effect of Relying on Settlement 
A notable characteristic of the overtreatment enforcement re-
gime is that few overtreatment allegations and investigations become 
overtreatment cases.167  This is clear due to the fact that “virtually all 
false claims cases” are settled.168  Given the potential costs of litigation 
and statutory penalties of an FCA violation, most providers targeted 
by an overtreatment investigation quickly settle any allegations and 
move on, knowing that any attempt at fighting them at trial risks their 
livelihoods and professional identities.169 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, federal prosecutors often seem content 
with settling FCA allegations.  Settlement saves litigation costs, avoids 
the risk of bad precedent, and may achieve the same level of deter-
rence as would a trial.170  Similar to the DOJ’s demonstrated strategy 
of using targeted Corporate Integrity Agreements (“CIAs”) and indi-
vidual settlements when regulating pharmaceutical companies under 
the fraud statutes, which allows the DOJ to “appear to be tough on 
health care fraud” while “avoid[ing] the risk that some of their fraud 
theories may not stand up in court,”171 settling with providers who 
have allegedly engaged in overtreatment has the same effect. 
The fact that its regulation largely depends upon settlement 
makes overtreatment susceptible to overenforcement, and may—from 
the providers’ perspectives—ultimately risk becoming illegitimate.  
Those providers who settle 
may . . . feel deeply wronged if the provider truly believes 
that the interpretation of program requirements urged by 
the government or relator is wrong (or that, in any event, 
the billing was not culpable) and that the settlement was ex-
                                                        
 167.  See Buck, supra note 9, at 505 n.287; Jost & Davies, supra note 66, at 307 (“To a 
provider who faces the risk of penalties often running into the millions of dollars, the fi-
nality of swift settlement will often look quite attractive compared to the risk of a much 
larger judgment and possibly criminal penalties or exclusion if the case goes to trial.  By 
settling early, the provider avoids future litigation costs, which might well be substantial.”). 
 168.  Jost & Davies, supra note 66, at 307. 
 169.  See Boese & McClain, supra note 135, at 18; Blanchard, supra note 129, at 114; see 
also Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims Seri-
ously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 1029 (2009) (noting that investigations cost the provider 
financially, as well as “disruption of the practice, damage to reputation,” and “resultant 
ostracism or termination of necessary business relationships”). 
 170.  Jost & Davies, supra note 66, at 308. 
 171.  See Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033, 1053–55 (2012) 
(noting the mutual desire in pharmaceutical fraud cases, from both the government and 
the targeted company, to settle).  
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torted from it because of the threat of massive penalties un-
der the civil FCA and criminal penalties or exclusion.172 
Startlingly, it could be the case that those engaged in legitimate 
treatment may actually be more likely to settle given the likelihood that 
they “fear the untoward effects of a fraud suit.”173  This assertion has 
major implications for an enforcement mechanism that relies nearly 
exclusively on settlement.  Notwithstanding these concerns, a settle-
ment-driven regulatory scheme has resulted.174 
With the cascading settlements for allegedly unnecessary medical 
services come particular challenges that threaten to clutter and weak-
en the enforcement framework.  Specifically, the reliance on settle-
ment (1) provides no clear precedent or strong condemnation of 
what the law prevents, (2) fails to avail itself of the important compo-
nent of community involvement and judicial input, (3) relies too 
heavily on federal prosecutorial discretion, and (4) exacts reputation-
al costs on investigated providers even absent settlement.175  Brief 
summaries of these challenges follow below. 
1.  No Clear Statement 
With few cases to test theories and make factual findings, the en-
forcement regime lacks an authoritative and cohesive statement of 
what, exactly, the law prevents—and where, in particular, the limits to 
that law are located.  In general, where overcriminalization has taken 
hold, “[i]t becomes a formidable task for the average person to know 
what the law forbids, because the moral code offers no lodestar.”176  
More fundamentally, where a legal rule is overenforced, it “tends to 
weaken the moral force of criminal law.”177 
The enforcement of a legal regime presents society’s opportunity 
to clearly and demonstrably declare certain behavior unacceptable.  
But in a regime susceptible to overcriminalization, the overuse of a 
legal rule “erodes the law’s ability to signal that certain conduct and 
certain people are out of bounds.”178  Society’s message is murky, and 
this message is further clouded in a regime with few demonstrable le-
                                                        
 172.  Jost & Davies, supra note 66, at 310–11. 
 173.  See Krause, supra note 16, at 208. 
 174.  Id. at 205–06.  
 175.  See Johnson, supra note 169.   
 176.  Larkin, supra note 14, at 720. 
 177.  Luna, supra note 18, at 729. 
 178.  Larkin, supra note 14, at 750. 
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gal standards to begin with, in an industry that—particularly for cut-
ting-edge procedures—often dwells in uncertainty. 
In the overtreatment context, this confusion is evident among 
settling providers.  Exemplified by settling hospitals during the so-
called kyphoplasty initiative, providers expressed confusion over what 
misconduct they had committed, and noted that they had not acted 
fraudulently, and probably clinically correctly.179  This confusion 
seemed understandable; the DOJ had entered into settlements with 
hospitals nationwide for performing a relatively new procedure on an 
inpatient basis instead of on an outpatient basis,180 even while clinical 
guidance seemed to require inpatient treatment.181 
Beyond the settling providers, when the DOJ achieves a settle-
ment, the public is often left unclear as to whether the provider 
committed intentional fraud, or simply whether the federal prosecu-
tors’ conception of medical necessity differed from the providers’ ini-
tial determination.  In overtreatment regulation, both types of pro-
viders are likely to become ensnared in an investigation, and both 
providers’ pictures are similarly likely to be splashed across newspaper 
headlines, along with their statements that they did nothing wrong. 
2.  Stunted and Skewed Development 
In addition to failing to strongly condemn certain behavior, the 
overtreatment enforcement framework fails to provide a structurally 
guaranteed opportunity for other parties who may have a vested in-
terest in the outcome of an investigation to have input in its enforce-
ment.  In a regime dependent on settlement, no opportunity exists 
for third parties—including patients, medical boards, trade organiza-
tions, and even judges—to influence the framework.  Instead, the 
federal prosecutor operates in something of an echo chamber, often 
with little meaningful challenge to her legal theory or investigatory 
strategy. 
Undoubtedly, the starkest absence from the overtreatment en-
forcement framework is that of the judiciary, and the development of 
the FCA itself has been stunted.182  No “FCA common law” has devel-
oped; instead, one must cobble resulting settlements together to dis-
                                                        
 179.  See Buck, supra note 9, at 497–99. 
 180.  Id. at 504. 
 181.  Id. at 497–99.  This initiative was started after a qui tam complaint was filed against 
a medical device company for deceptive sales and marketing of kyphoplasty kits.  See id. at 
496–97. 
 182.  See Krause, supra note 16, at 205–06 (noting the development of the law is stifled). 
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cern a pattern of enforcement.  This is particularly the case in the 
overtreatment context, where, often, patient harm is not obvious (or 
non-existent) and the provider’s intent may not be ascertainable.183 
This may be unsurprising, considering that the federal govern-
ment is driving the enforcement framework and its prosecutors are 
authoring its newest theories of liability.  However, by avoiding trials, 
the regime silences other voices that may have an interest in influenc-
ing it—and limits the citizenry from being able to infuse the law with 
the “conscience of the community.”184  In their role as jurors, citizens 
can prevent overreaching and overenforcement and assign culpabil-
ity.185  This interaction gives the citizenry an important opportunity to 
influence the application and meaning of the law.186 
In addition to largely shutting out the medical community, the 
enforcement regime forecloses the opportunity to secure a consulta-
tion point with a disinterested clinical expert.  In a move that sur-
prised commentators, the DOJ reached out to the HRS in order to re-
view the medical necessity of ICD placement, and this likely led to the 
more granular and reasoned Resolution Model.187  This demonstrates 
the importance of such a consultation as well as the absence of such a 
consultation in other overtreatment investigations. 
As a result, in many investigations, there is no party to ensure 
that legal enforcement does not impose on clinical practice to the 
detriment of patients.  Because the DOJ may lack firsthand expertise 
on clinical impact, the regulators must take it upon themselves to 
reach out to external clinical experts to determine whether or not the 
medical care at issue was inefficient and medically unnecessary, or, al-
ternatively, whether it was a socially and medically beneficial cutting-
edge procedure.  Within many overtreatment investigations, discern-
ing this type of distinction is hard enough for clinical experts; it is vir-
tually impossible for federal prosecutors.  But even this clinical con-
sultation is not guaranteed in a settlement-based regime. 
                                                        
 183.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 184.  Jessica L. West, Is Injustice Relevant?  Narrative and Blameworthiness in Protester Trials, 
86 TEMP. L. REV. 107, 138 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185.  Id. at 138–39 (“Because criminal trials function as evaluations of culpability, juries 
have an important role in deciding whether an individual’s action is blameworthy.  By un-
dertaking this evaluation, juries provide a backstop against government overreaching, 
overcriminalization, and the application of statutes that have ossified outdated values or 
social mores.”). 
 186.  See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579 (2014). 
 187.  See RESOLUTION MODEL, supra note 112. 
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3.  The Creation of “Superlegislators” 
Federal prosecutors own the decision as to whether or not to ini-
tially open an overtreatment investigation.  With little resistance from 
within the provisions of the FCA, an impressive financial return on in-
vestment, and the ease with which settlement can often be achieved, 
the discretion of the prosecutor becomes paramount.  Given these 
factors, it seems difficult to argue for investigatory restraint within this 
enforcement regime, especially when prosecutors are “under constant 
public pressure to do more, catch more, and be tougher.”188  As a re-
sult, the federal prosecutor’s goal of preventing behavior that harms 
taxpayers—a constant concern in the prosecution of health care 
fraud189—may be deified to the exclusion of other policy concerns.190  
The prosecutor has uncommon power in deciding when and where to 
regulate overtreatment as health care fraud: 
Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that federalization 
will lead to a situation wherein the U.S. Attorney becomes, 
in effect, a “superlegislator,” deciding the extent to which 
the law will be applied over large classes of crime.  Because 
resources are limited, the prosecutor alone decides which 
cases will go to court and which will not.191 
                                                        
 188.  Johnson, supra note 169, at 1017. 
 189.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Departments of Justice 
and Health and Human Services Announce Record-Breaking Recoveries Resulting from 
Joint Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/02/20130211a.html (“‘This was a record-
breaking year for the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services in our col-
laborative effort to crack down on health care fraud and protect valuable taxpayer dollars,’ 
said Attorney General Holder. . . . ‘This report demonstrates our serious commitment to 
prosecuting health care fraud and safeguarding our world-class health care programs from 
abuse.’”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Obama Administration Announces Ground-
Breaking Public-Private Partnership to Prevent Health Care Fraud (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-ag-926.html [hereinafter, Partnership Press 
Release] (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder as saying “[t]his administration has estab-
lished a record of success in combating devastating fraud crimes, but there is more we can 
and must do to protect patients, consumers, essential health care programs, and precious 
taxpayer dollars”); see also David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulato-
ry Alternatives in a “Competitive” Health Care Era, 19 LOY. U. L.J. 1133, 1165–66 (1988) (not-
ing that the Anti-Kickback Statute “was designed to safeguard the integrity of the Medicare 
program and to protect patients and taxpayers from profiteering and abusive practices”).  
 190.  See Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 276 (2004) (“Given the balance of power, it should come as no 
surprise that prosecutors have the power to ‘encourage’ settlements, even where abstract 
legal analysis might favor the defendant. . . . Such concerns may be an inevitable conse-
quence of the prosecutorial discretion granted by the fraud laws.”). 
 191.  See Harrington, supra note 60, at 148.   
  
298 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:259 
Beyond deciding the targets and penalties within the enforce-
ment framework, prosecutors operating in a regime subject to over-
criminalization are able to “trip up morally blameless parties” and “to 
coerce guilty pleas from defendants seeking only to avoid unduly 
harsh punishments.”192 
Recognizing the potential for FCA overuse against health care 
providers and responding to pressure to limit application of the 
FCA,193 then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a guidance 
memorandum in 1998, cautioning federal prosecutors and health 
care fraud coordinators to be judicious about its use.194  In the docu-
ment “Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health 
Care Matters,” Holder warned: 
While the broad reach and substantial damages and civil 
penalties under the Act make it one of the Department’s 
most powerful tools, Departmental attorneys are obligated to 
use their authority under the Act in a fair and responsible 
manner.  This is particularly important in the context of na-
tional initiatives, which can have a broad impact on health 
care providers across the country.195 
Further, Holder encouraged federal prosecutors to carefully ex-
amine whether or not the provider acted with requisite fraudulent in-
tent, directing the DOJ to examine the “pervasiveness or magnitude 
of the false claims” in order to determine whether or not the claims 
“support[ed] an inference that they resulted from deliberate igno-
rance or intentional or reckless conduct rather than mere mis-
takes.”196  Holder gave additional general guidance for prosecuting 
corporations in a subsequent 1999 memorandum.197 
Federal prosecutors often constitute the primary fact-finder with-
in other legal regimes, but in the overtreatment enforcement context, 
                                                        
 192.  Larkin, supra note 14, at 735. 
 193.  See Hyman, supra note 84, at 556–57 (noting that guidelines were a result of an 
“impressive lobbying campaign seeking a moratorium on enforcement actions” following 
questionable FCA investigations by the DOJ and OIG). 
 194.  Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen. of Dep’t of Justice, on 
Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health Care Matters (June 3, 1998), 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/chcm.htm [hereinafter Holder Memoran-
dum]. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
197.  See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen. of Dep’t of Justice, 
to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF. 
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governed nearly exclusively by settlement, the prosecutor resembles 
something approaching the sole arbiter of justice.  For a system in 
which nearly every provider settles, and the investigation itself brings 
with it some reputational penalty for the targeted provider, the initial 
decision of whether or not to investigate a particular provider—that 
is, whom the government decides to target—easily becomes the most 
important determination in the enforcement framework.198 
4.  The Punitive Power of the Fraud Investigation 
In addition to relying on settlement, the DOJ is able to count on 
the power of the investigation itself to force a change in provider be-
havior.  This is because even when the DOJ decides not to seek dam-
ages or otherwise impose liability, the personal and individual cost of 
the investigation on one’s medical reputation is substantial.199  The 
cloud of impropriety—formed the moment an investigation of a par-
ticular provider is commenced—also impacts other physicians’ prac-
tice patterns and professional view of the targeted provider.200 
The punitive nature of a health care fraud investigation is per-
sonally consequential for providers; a fraud investigation and prosecu-
tion can impose significant costs due to “the importance of reputa-
tion” in the industry.201  Indeed, “[t]he risk to reputation from a fraud 
charge is especially severe among professionals . . . whose good name 
is crucial in their business,” and “the interest in avoiding the stigma of 
dishonesty is very substantial.”202  The DOJ’s failure to appropriately 
narrow its investigation can inflict substantial reputational harm.203  
                                                        
 198.  See Brown, supra note 36, at 223–24 (introducing the majoritarian view of over-
criminalization as “expand[ing] the discretion of prosecutors to the point of lawlessness 
because, with broad codes, they can effectively pick and choose offenders as well as offens-
es”).   
 199.  See Johnson, supra note 169, at 1000–02 (noting that the fraud investigation can 
serve as its own penalty).  Indeed, “[t]he costs of the inquiry or investigation include fi-
nancial costs, disruption of the practice, damage to reputation, resultant ostracism or ter-
mination of necessary business relationships, stress, shame, and other losses that are quite 
significant.”  Id. at 1029.  See also Frank LaSalle, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a 
Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 525 (1995) 
(“In the case of a contractor or health care provider, the allegation of fraud could serious-
ly damage its business opportunities.”).  
 200.  See Johnson, supra note 169, at 1029. 
 201.  See Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A Multi-
dimensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443, 465 
n.115 (1997). 
 202.  LaSalle, supra note 199, at 525. 
 203.  Johnson, supra note 169, at 1029–30 (“At the same time, regulators enforcing 
standards want to assure that they uncover the few bad apples and so may cast a broad in-
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And, as Professor Joan Krause has noted, over-regulation of health 
care fraud may increase provider distrust and, ultimately, destroy pro-
vider buy-in to the overall regulatory framework.204  Contributing to 
providers’ distrust of the regulatory scheme is the sense that the rules 
are “unfair and irrational”205—an allegation undoubtedly strength-
ened when innocent providers are subject to fraud investigations that 
place their reputations in peril. 
Further, to some providers administering overtreatment subject-
ed to a DOJ investigation, FCA application may constitute definitional 
spillover, as defined above.  The FCA, created initially to prevent and 
punish individuals who were selling defective armaments to Union 
soldiers during the Civil War206 and modernized during various 
amendments to apply to cases in which an individual or entity at-
tempts to defraud the federal government more generally, was not in-
tended for use as a standard of care regulation nor a rationing tool. 
Definitional spillover occurs when some providers are captured 
within the regulatory regime and their cases are “not justified by its 
underlying social purpose.”207  Providers investigated by the federal 
government but who administered an ICD placement pursuant to 
their own clinical judgment—albeit outside the Medicare NCD—
would be caught in an enforcement regime that is not intended to 
apply to them.  The social purpose of preventing and punishing 
health care fraud—intentional deceit and unlawful conversion of tax-
payer dollars—is not served by capturing actors when the NCD di-
verges from defensible clinical expertise. 
                                                        
vestigative net.  This broad net would be expected to catch the small number of violators, 
but it would also be expected to catch a number of doctors who will not be charged with 
violations.  The regulator who justifies casting the investigative net broadly as triggering 
‘only’ an inquiry or further investigation but not necessarily sanctions fails to appreciate 
the substantial penalties that are inherent in the investigation itself.  The intent of the 
law—protection of patients—is subverted by a ‘catch-and-release’ surveillance system. . . . 
At a minimum, regulators should set the parameters for investigation and inquiry as nar-
rowly as possible to achieve the goals that they desire, and in a fashion that does not con-
tradict the formal legal standard.  They should recognize that they have to balance the risk 
that some violators will not be caught if the investigative parameters are too narrow with 
the risk that the majority of doctors will gear their practice to avoid being investigated.”). 
 204.  See Krause, supra note 16, at 127. 
 205.  See Diane E. Hoffman, Physicians Who Break the Law, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1049, 1054 
(2009). 
 206.  See THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER, supra note 149. 
 207.  Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 26, at 1748. 
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B.  The Limits of Harm and Intent 
In overtreatment regulation, settling providers and entities 
commonly trumpet their innocence.  Often accompanying the DOJ’s 
press release announcing the newest settlement with those trying to 
defraud the health care system, settling providers and entities note 
(1) that they “did not know” they were doing anything wrong, and (2) 
that they did not actually inflict any harm (either on their patients or 
on taxpayers).  These statements invoke the two showings that typical-
ly measure the extent of an actor’s misconduct under the law—intent 
and harm.208  By stating that they did not know they were doing any-
thing wrong, the provider or entity is noting that they did not act with 
the requisite intent under the FCA, and by noting that no harm oc-
curred, they are invoking the age-old doctrine of “no harm, no 
foul.”209  Through these statements, the settling actor is indicating 
that they did not deserve to be targeted and that the sanction or pen-
alty they face is undeserved.210 
But these attempts are fleeting.  In overtreatment regulation, 
largely due to the reliance on settlement, the lack of proof of intent 
and no showing of clear, discernible harm opens the regime to fur-
ther inconsistency—and puts it at further risk of overenforcement. 
1.  The Harm Challenge 
First, regarding the harm principle, Professor Krause, in a pro-
phetic work more than a decade ago, aptly and adroitly analyzed the 
“harm problem” in FCA application to health care fraud.211  Krause 
concluded that the courts’ (and the federal government’s) incon-
sistent treatment of the fiscal harm requirement in FCA enforcement 
raised questions about the legitimacy of the regime.212  Particularly, 
Krause noted that: 
                                                        
 208.  See Burrell, supra note 44, at 1301 (noting the importance of the two standards in 
the white collar crime context). 
 209.  Courts invoke this limitation on liability in a number of contexts.  See, e.g., In re 
DiMartino v. Aquidneck Court Assocs., 108 B.R. 394, 403 (D.R.I. 1989) (“The no-harm-no-
foul rule of the basketball court should be applied in this law court.”). 
 210.  See Luna, supra note 18, at 714 (noting that, in the criminal context, “the criminal 
sanction should be reserved for specific behaviors and mental states that are so wrongful 
and harmful to their direct victims or the general public as to justify the official condem-
nation and denial of freedom that flow from a guilty verdict”). 
 211.  See generally Krause, supra note 16 (documenting multiple courts’ treatments of the 
harm requirement under the FCA). 
 212.  See id. at 217 (noting that “[w]ithout a limiting principle to distinguish conduct 
that is truly deserving of censure under the FCA from minor noncompliance that does not 
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 Traditionally, health care FCA cases have involved claims 
for services that were not provided at all or were not provid-
ed as indicated on the bill.  The theory of government harm 
in these cases is straightforward: the government paid for 
items or services that it did not receive, and has been dam-
aged by the amount of the (over)payment.  The further the 
cases stray from this paradigm, however, the less clear it is 
that the government has suffered actionable harm.213 
This concern is shared—and accentuated—in the regulation of 
overtreatment.  In the overtreatment context, the care billed for was 
administered, and, like in the ICD initiative above, did not harm a pa-
tient (and likely was clinically beneficial), but the DOJ uses the FCA to 
penalize the provider for some aspect of that care. 
Generally, federal prosecutors and health care regulators seek to 
prevent and remedy two chief harms through health care fraud initia-
tives and prosecutions.214  First and foremost, they seek to prevent 
harm to taxpayers, and second, they seek to prevent harm to patients.  
According to the DOJ itself, health care prosecutions pursue “perpe-
trators intent on lining their own pockets at the expense of the Amer-
ican taxpayer, patients, and private insurers,” with a particular con-
cern on the “long term solvency of Medicare and Medicaid.”215  Even 
though Attorney General Holder has noted that the federal govern-
ment’s anti-fraud efforts are focused on protecting patients, consum-
ers, programs, and taxpayers,216 it is clear that the primary focus seeks 
to limit and prevent harm to the American taxpayer.217  According to 
                                                        
affect government payment decisions, the health care industry may come to believe that 
the law is being enforced unfairly”).   
 213.  Id. at 142 (footnote omitted). 
 214.  See, e.g., Partnership Press Release, supra note 189 (quoting Attorney General Eric 
Holder as saying, “[t]his administration has established a record of success in combating 
devastating fraud crimes, but there is more we can and must do to protect patients, con-
sumers, essential health care programs, and precious taxpayer dollars”); see also Hyman, 
supra note 189, at 1165–66. (noting that the Anti-Kickback Statute “was designed to safe-
guard the integrity of the Medicare program and to protect patients and taxpayers from 
profiteering and abusive practices”). 
 215. HEAT: A Year of Tackling Health Care Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/934; see, e.g., Holder Memorandum, supra note 
194; see also Josh Savitz & Erica Trachtman, False Statements and False Claims, 49 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 703, 737 (2012) (“The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (‘PPACA’), enact-
ed in March 2010, expanded the scope of the False Claims Act in an effort to combat 
health care fraud and recover taxpayer dollars.”). 
 216.  See Partnership Press Release, supra note 189. 
 217.  American taxpayers pay $554 billion dollars each year for Medicare and pay 
roughly $403 billion per year for Medicaid.  See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 762 (7th ed. 2013); see also Colleen Shalby & Jason Kane, 
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Acting Associate Attorney General Tony West, “protecting taxpayers 
from fraud, waste, and abuse [is] . . . one of the Attorney General’s 
top priorities.”218 
In addition to protecting American taxpayers, the DOJ seeks to 
prevent harm to patients.219  Throughout the 1990s, the DOJ opened 
investigations and prosecuted cases targeting providers who failed to 
meet a quality of care standard.220  In these cases, the federal govern-
ment sought to use typical anti-fraud tools to both punish those re-
sponsible for truly abhorrent health care and elevate the quality of 
care administered, and the goals of preventing patient harm and pre-
venting taxpayer harm were connected.  Those who provided bad 
care and billed the federal government for that care were, quite clear-
ly, defrauding the government by billing for worthless services.221 
In overtreatment initiatives, however, the harm is difficult to dis-
cern because it is often unknown.  Even though the administration of 
unnecessary care is indisputably harmful,222 the question of whether 
or not the patient received unnecessary care is the debated determi-
native question in the overtreatment context.  If the treatment was 
                                                        
Medicaid: Your Questions Answered, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/10/medicaid-your-questions-
answered.html (including Christina Bellantoni and Phil Galewitz’s discussion of medicade 
costs).  Within the DOJ’s FY 2013 Budget Request, the DOJ notes that it “focuses its inves-
tigative and litigation resources to eliminating fraud, returning ill-gotten gains to the 
Treasury and others, and strengthening our public health care programs.”  U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FY 2013 BUDGET REQUEST: HEALTH CARE FRAUD 1, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/06/30/health-care-
fraud.pdf.  To this end, the DOJ requested nearly $72 million in budget increases to “ex-
pand DOJ’s investigative and litigation capacity to address health care fraud.”  Id. 
 218.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Acting Associate Attorney General Tony 
West Speaks at Pen and Pad Briefing Announcing Record Civil FY 2012 Recoveries (Dec. 4, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/asg/speeches/2012/asg-speech-1212041.html). 
 219.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Tony West 
Speaks at American Bar Association Day at the University of Chicago Law School (Apr. 27, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/2011/civ-speech-110427.html 
(“We’ve been particularly effective in fighting health care fraud, over the last two years 
opening more health care fraud matters, securing larger judgments and fines, negotiating 
higher settlements and recovering more money—over $8B—than ever before. . . . And 
there are cases that clearly illustrate how health care fraud can undermine quality care and 
patient safety.”). 
 220.  Devin S. Schindler, Pay for Performance, Quality of Care and the Revitalization of the 
False Claims Act, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 387, 396–400 (2009). 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a 
Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 90 (2011) (“Unnecessary care that lacks therapeutic 
benefit is presumptively poor quality care, and it arguably represents malpractice if harm 
occurs to the patient.”). 
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unnecessary, the patient was harmed; if the treatment was clinically 
defensible, the patient likely was not.  The determination is not a le-
gal one; it is medical.  And the conclusion as to whether the proce-
dure was medically necessary or not for the patient directly informs 
the question as to whether or not the taxpayer was harmed.  For ex-
ample, within the ICD initiative, if providers who placed the ICD at 
Day 38223 committed only a “technical violation” but benefitted their 
patients, an allegation of harm becomes difficult to prove.  Instead, 
the government tasked with paying for “reasonable and necessary”224 
medical care could not have suffered any loss. 
2.  The Problem of Intent 
Obviously, for health fraud allegations resolved by settlement, 
federal prosecutors do not have to carry the burden of proving fraud-
ulent intent—whatever, exactly, that now means.225  The initial deter-
minations of which providers administer treatment that is “false,” and 
which providers are “deceptive” enough to draw an investigation be-
come paramount.  Conversely, in other scenarios and industries 
where the FCA and other fraud statutes are employed, the require-
ment that the defendant act with fraudulent intent separates the 
schemer from the non-fraudulent negligent actor; it is the difference 
between the intentional deceptive act and an unreasonable but unin-
tentional mistake. 
But in the regulation of overtreatment, enforced largely by set-
tlement, the intent of the provider is comparatively unimportant.226  
Instead, a provider’s intent is often left unclear; it is simply inferred 
by the DOJ and the public from the alleged egregiousness or unreasona-
bleness of the care administered because there is often no other metric 
with which to measure.  Whether the DOJ has evidence that a provid-
er engaged in fraudulent behavior or was simply negligent—typically 
a major distinction in the law—may not be a dispositive distinction for 
                                                        
 223.  ICDs placed within forty days of a myocardial infarction were deemed to be “tech-
nical” violations.  See RESOLUTION MODEL, supra note 112, at 9. 
 224.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2012). 
 225.  See generally Sheyn, supra note 135. 
 226.  This tracks the minimization of fraudulent intent in health care fraud cases more 
generally.  See Hoffman, supra note 205, at 1060 (“[I]t appears that some physicians are 
prosecuted for unintentional violations of the law. . . . The absence of intent is not deter-
minative.”).   
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the imposition of liability or the opening of an investigation.  The fact 
that one was merely negligent may not offer any protection.227 
Early on in the investigation, no distinction among providers is 
made.228  For example, in the ICD investigation, it is unclear whether 
fraudulent intent mattered in the initial stages of the investigation, 
especially because the DOJ swept up all providers who performed 
ICDs outside of Medicare’s timing requirements.  The question of why 
the providers performed ICD placements outside of the NCD timing 
requirement was simply one to be answered later in the investigation.  
The DOJ uses clinical reasonableness as a standard to separate those 
who committed health care fraud from those who may have commit-
ted “technical” violations. 
The challenges associated with proving intent in these cases are 
further complicated by five practical problems associated with initially 
establishing fraudulent intent in all overtreatment cases.  Even where 
a provider acts with fraudulent intent, it is often difficult to discern.  
And given how damaging fraud investigations can be to providers, 
where provider intent is not clear from the early facts of the case, a 
drawn-out overtreatment investigation can quickly become a costly 
exercise in debating granular medical regulations and practice stand-
ards (to which the law and the blunt FCA would seem to be ill-
equipped to speak). 
No fact-finding.  First, as aforementioned, few trials in this context 
ever occur, and the regime lacks judicial involvement or review.  As a 
result, the fact-finding function of the legal process is shortchanged.  
Because the government rarely has to prove a provider’s intent, both 
the public, and more importantly, other providers, do not know 
whether the settling provider acted culpably—and had participated in 
a fraudulent scheme—or whether they were a victim of a seemingly-
roving enforcement mechanism.  Settling providers are happy to ar-
gue their innocence,229 noting that their reasons for being outside the 
                                                        
 227.  Ryan Winkler, The Civil False Claims Act and Its Unreasonably Broad Scope of Liability: 
The Need for Real “Clarifications” Following the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 60 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 533, 547 (2012). 
 228.  See id. (“Moreover, it appears that merely negligent defendants are now subject to 
liability under the amended FCA.”). 
 229.  See North Ohio Heart Reaches Settlement; Continues to Provide High-Quality Cardiac Care, 
NORTH OHIO HEART: OHIO MEDICAL GROUP (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://blog.partnersforyourhealth.com/Blog/bid/93734/North-Ohio-Heart-Reaches-
Settlement-Continues-to-Provide-High-Quality-Cardiac-Care [hereinafter NOHC Blog 
Post] (quoting a statement issued by John Schaeffer, M.D., Chairman and President, 
North Ohio Heart Center: “[t]he settlement is not an admission of wrongdoing; rather, we 
settled this matter so we can put it behind us and move forward”); Saabira Chaudhuri, 
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norm were legitimate230 or that they were following government-
endorsed guidance,231 while the DOJ calls the settling doctors greedy 
and irresponsible.232 
The limitation of hindsight.  Second, because medical expertise ad-
vances so quickly, particularly in specialties in which cutting-edge 
treatments are often employed, it is difficult to retroactively review a 
clinical decision made five or ten years earlier.  Many overtreatment 
investigations are focused on cutting-edge medical procedures,233 for 
which the clinical standard of care has not cemented.  Because of this, 
it is comparatively easy for the DOJ to retroactively point toward a 
procedure that, with the assistance of hindsight, looks unnecessary or 
wasteful.234  But just because the cutting-edge procedure was not done 
in accordance with today’s medical standards does not make its ad-
ministration ten years ago wasteful, nor does it demonstrate the exist-
ence of fraudulent intent on behalf of the provider. 
Lack of consensus.  Third, within the complex world of medical 
practice, clinical disagreement is often the norm.  By using a fact-
specific clinical guideline as the demarcation line between appropri-
ate care and fraudulent care, the DOJ may over-capture physicians 
who provide satisfactory and non-fraudulent care within the regulato-
                                                        
DaVita Agrees to $55M Settlement, DENVER POST (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_20996923/davita-agrees-55m-settlement (“‘DaVita and its 
affiliated physicians did nothing wrong and stand by their anemia management practices,’ 
the company said.”); John Commins, Rex Healthcare to Pay $1.9M to Settle Fraud Claims, 
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-
2/HEP-264523/Rex-Healthcare-to-Pay-19M-to-Settle-Fraud-Claims (“When the govern-
ment decided to retroactively penalize people who had billed it as inpatient before 2007 
we were caught with that.  We didn’t think we did anything wrong.  We think it is unfair, 
but it was probably better to settle.”). 
 230.  See NOHC Blog Post, supra note 229 (“As leaders in cardiac care, we have always 
been early adopters of new technology when we believe using it will help improve our pa-
tients’ lives.”). 
 231.  See Commins, supra note 229 (“During that time we were following the InterQual 
third-party billing recommendations to bill this as an impatient procedure.  In 2007 when 
it was deemed to be an outpatient procedure we began billing it as outpatient.”). 
 232.  For his part, Steven M. Dettelbach, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of 
Ohio, admonished that “[p]atient health and taxpayer dollars have to come before greed.”  
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EMH Regional Medical Center and North Ohio Heart 
Center to Pay $4.4 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ohn/news/2013/04janemh.html [hereinafter EMH Region-
al Medical Center]. 
233.  See supra notes 95–127 and accompanying text; see also Buck, supra note 9, at 497–
99. 
 234.  Id.; see also NOHC Blog Post, supra note 229 (noting that the procedures covered 
by settlement were “cutting edge at the time” and that “[c]ardiac care has progressed sig-
nificantly in just the past few years”). 
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ry net.  For example, multiple physicians could debate and disagree 
on a given course of treatment, but whether or not the physicians who 
subscribe to the minority position actually engaged in fraud is a whol-
ly separate question, dependent—unsurprisingly—on the provider’s 
intent.  Even when procedures are no longer viewed as cutting-edge 
procedures, clinical agreement can be difficult to achieve.235  These 
debates further cloud the culpability analysis.236 
Because there can be wide disagreement within the medical 
community itself, it is both (1) difficult to demonstrate that a provider 
“outside the norm” was aware that she was so, and (2) easy to find 
providers who are “outside the norm”—potential targets of an investi-
gation—because the standard has not fully gelled.237  In many clinical 
areas, no norm exists: medicine is as much an “art” as it is a science—
practice patterns are often viewed as individualized and personal,238 
and standardization is often seen as hostile to the unique practice of 
medicine.239  Characterizing each medical decision as exclusively “ap-
propriate” or “fraudulent” overgeneralizes and disregards the com-
plexity involved in providing care.240 
Mere awareness is not enough.  Fourth, providers may be aware of 
different procedures’ reimbursement rates—and may know which are 
the most lucrative.  Within Medicare’s reimbursement system, provid-
ers know that if they provide extra, unnecessary treatments, they will 
                                                        
 235.  See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1165, 1218–19 (2012). 
 236.  See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 205, at 1075 (discussing the application of laws to 
physicians when the standard of care is not unified and noting the “laws are medically 
questionable” and “make arguments to harshly treat these physicians more difficult”). 
 237.  Once identified (which takes time), medical guidelines can easily become stale 
and are subject to loopholes that “enable clinicians to practice individualized medicine.”  
See Mehlman, supra note 235, at 1218–19. 
 238.  See S.C. Panda, Medicine: Science or Art?, 4 MENS SANA MONOGRAPHS 127 (2006), 
available at http://www.msmonographs.org/printarticle.asp?issn=0973-
1229;year=2006;volume=4;issue=1;spage=127;epage=138;aulast=Panda.  Many physicians 
are hostile to the move toward standardizing medical practice, calling it “cookbook medi-
cine,” but many policy-makers believe in standardization.  See Andis Robeznieks, Not ‘Cook-
book Medicine,’ MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 1, 2013), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130601/MAGAZINE/306019990/1138. 
 239.  See Robeznieks, supra note 238. 
 240.  In 2006, when the North Ohio Heart Center in Northeastern Ohio was placing 
drug-eluting stents at four times the national average, experts called their behavior “rea-
sonable” and noted that “doctors in a particular geographic area tend to be unaware if the 
way they are treating their patients is markedly different from the practices of their peers 
in other areas.”  Reed Abelson, Heart Procedure Is off the Charts in an Ohio City, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 18, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/business/18stent.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
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most likely experience higher revenue, due to Medicare’s inability 
heretofore to limit volume in any meaningful way.241  These incentives 
to aggressively treat may impact a provider’s administration of health 
care, but whether or not the provider is acting greedily, irresponsibly, 
or fraudulently is another question entirely.242  Nor does being aware 
of reimbursement rates mean that the provider is acting out of his 
“desire . . . to maximize profits” instead of “the medical needs of pa-
tients.”243 
Expecting providers to stand against their own economic inter-
ests when the health care administration and delivery system has been 
structured to incentivize them to be aware of, and exploit, profit con-
cerns, seems at least confusing, and perhaps unjust.  Indeed, 
“[p]rovider responses to the incentives offered by public health care 
financing program payment structures cannot always easily be catego-
rized as legitimate or illegitimate.  Rather, they lie along a continuum 
ranging from beneficial to inexcusable.”244  The distinctions, if they 
exist, are fine; they depend on a finely-tuned regulatory scheme, not 
the largest club in the government’s arsenal. 
Resulting potential under-capture.  Finally, and perhaps most surpris-
ingly, the problems inherent in the overtreatment enforcement re-
gime work not only to over-capture individuals who may not have act-
ed with the requisite fraudulent intent, but may under-capture a 
number of providers who act with requisite fraudulent intent but who 
elude detection.  As Professors Lemos and Stein note, “By allowing 
law enforcers to seek penalties in just a few cases out of many, the 
model will incentivize them to concentrate their efforts on easy cas-
es . . . .”  Those sophisticated violators who conceal their misdeeds 
“consequently will acquire a practical immunity against prosecutions, 
while the law enforcers go after and impose harsh penalties upon 
small-time offenders.”245 
In overtreatment regulation, these “sophisticated violators” are 
the providers who administer the extra procedure not to benefit the 
                                                        
 241.  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 222, at 789–91 (noting that physicians increase vol-
ume of services administered to achieve higher Medicare reimbursement without limita-
tion). 
 242.  See EMH Regional Medical Center, supra note 232 (capturing descriptive words 
used by the U.S. attorney in a recently settled case). 
 243.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justce, Fifty-Five Hospitals to Pay U.S. More Than 
$34 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Related to Kyphoplasty (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/July/13-civ-745.htm. 
 244.  Jost & Davies, supra note 66, at 254. 
 245.  Lemos & Stein, supra note 66, at 12. 
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patient, but rather, to increase their reimbursement amount, but do 
so in a way that does not raise the attention of the DOJ.  If the provid-
er’s overtreatment—administration of an unnecessary open heart 
surgery for an elderly patient, for example—does not clearly fall out-
side of the norm of other providers or an easy-to-apply medical stand-
ard, the DOJ likely never initiates an investigation, no matter the 
wrongfulness of the clinical care offered to a particular individual pa-
tient.  As a consequence, providers may be incentivized to protect one 
another by standardizing wasteful procedures—and herd immunity 
results. 
Outside of the qui tam mechanism, investigators have limited 
tools to distinguish the cases in which the provider is acting in the in-
terests of the patient (those cases in which it truly is the case that the 
individual could be benefited by the procedure, for example) from 
the cases in which the provider is instead acting in his own self-
interest, knowing that his administered care will not raise a red flag.  
If it truly is the case that individuals will only get flagged if they are 
outside the clinical norm, then crooked providers can simply offer 
care that is within—or close to—that norm, all the while seeking pri-
marily to line their own pockets.  This strongly highlights the im-
portance of maintaining a cooperative regulatory scheme between the 
legal regulators and the medical professionals; conversely, increasing 
tension between the two further leads to major investigatory chal-
lenges.  A disordered framework has a tendency to instill and foster 
an “us against them” mentality in the medical profession. 
V. RECALIBRATING THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
Perhaps the most likely fix of overtreatment overenforcement 
will come from the institution that may shoulder the most blame for 
building the overbroad enforcement framework in the first place.  In 
August of 2013, Representative Howard Coble (R-NC) introduced a 
bill entitled the “Fairness in Health Care Claims, Guidance, and In-
vestigations Act,”246 noting that “[t]he tension between the medical 
profession and federal investigators has never been higher.”247  Repre-
sentative Coble’s bill radically constricts usage of the FCA, and would 
impact—and perhaps end—its application to cases of clinically defen-
                                                        
 246.  H.R. 2931, 113th Cong. (2013), 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2931/text. 
 247.  Ed McDonald, Coble Introduces Hospital Fairness Bill, CONGRESSMAN HOWARD COBLE 
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://coble.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=345007. 
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sible overtreatment by installing four dramatic requirements in ad-
vance of an FCA investigation.  Specifically, the proposed law would 
(1) require the Attorney General to certify that the allegations are “vi-
able” and “appropriately pursued,” (2) limit application to underlying 
claims reflecting “a material amount,” (3) grant immunity to provid-
ers who submit bills “in good faith reliance on erroneous infor-
mation,” and (4) raise the standard of proof for all FCA cases—from 
the current civil standard of preponderance of the evidence to a 
higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.248 
Coble appears to be concerned about over-application of the 
FCA to non-culpable conduct within the health care industry.  He is 
quoted on his website as noting: 
The U.S. Justice Department is claiming that hospitals that 
admit patients for an overnight stay, instead of simply ob-
serving, treating and discharging their patients, are commit-
ting fraud.  My hope is that this legislation will help ease this 
tension. 
 . . . . 
 Whether patients realize this or not, . . . the actions of the 
Justice Department are diminishing the quality of care that 
hospitals can provide to many patients.  Sending patients 
home against doctors’ orders is unwise.  This bill will allow 
hospitals to concentrate on patients and not confusing and 
duplicative regulations.249 
Unsurprisingly, the American Hospital Association (“AHA”) has 
heralded Coble’s proposal.250  By requiring Attorney General review, 
immunizing providers who are misled by voluminous regulations, and 
ratcheting up the intent standard for all FCA cases, the bill would un-
doubtedly have an impact on the regulation of overtreatment. 
Apart from the political feasibility of Representative Coble’s pro-
posal, his suggestions begin to address some of the concerns raised by 
overenforcement theory, the breadth of the FCA, and both the pro-
cedural and substantive challenges that complicate the regulation of 
overtreatment.  His suggestions counsel toward narrowing health 
fraud investigations so they only target those most deserving of a 
                                                        
 248.  See H.R. 2931. 
 249.  See McDonald, supra note 247. 
 250.  See Aaron M. Danzig, Sometimes a Mistake Is Just a Mistake: Bill Introduced in the House 
of Representatives to Push Back Against Aggressive Department of Justice Health Care False Claims 
Investigations, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f2a1edb9-d398-4d18-a071-00196a7c7f82. 
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health fraud investigation.  At the least, they attempt to introduce 
clear rules governing the application of the FCA in the health fraud 
context. 
Notwithstanding Coble’s proposal, generally, by both (1) being 
cognizant of the scope of the investigation and (2) adopting a prac-
tice of consulting with the medical community, federal prosecutors 
would be able to change the regulation of overtreatment without 
completely rebuilding the enforcement regime.  A mandatory consul-
tation with a disinterested clinical expert would not only steer fraud 
investigations toward those who committed intentional and harmful 
health care fraud, but would also address some of the intransigent 
sources of medical-legal dissonance—particularly the failure of com-
munication between law and medicine251—within the complex indus-
try of American health care.  If providers feel that health fraud regu-
lation is fair and ordered, they will be more likely to cooperate within 
that framework.  Sensing a reasonable enforcement framework, pro-
viders may become more likely to assist in regulating their own pro-
fession instead of turning inward against the lawyers, as they currently 
do.252 
Above all, the determination of whether fraud occurred should 
no longer be solely legal, aggressive, and adversarial determinations, 
but instead, should be medical, flexible, and cooperative determina-
tions.  Namely, a new regime would incorporate more medical exper-
tise, foster more cooperation between the government prosecutors 
and potential targets of investigation, and feature a range of accepta-
ble clinical practice.  This would further legitimize the regime, and, 
ultimately, encourage provider buy-in because if providers respect the 
enforcement regime, they will heed its prohibitions253 and can actually 
assist in the execution of the law.254 
                                                        
 251.  See Johnson, supra note 169, at 1014 (noting that “doctors hear about legal risk 
from colleagues,” and that “the more that lawyers tell doctors that what they have heard is 
untrue, the more the untrue stories may be viewed as accurate”). 
 252.  See id. at 1010 (noting “physicians’ fears of the risk of legal entanglement”). 
 253.  See Stephen Townley, The Hydraulics of Fighting Terrorism, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 
108 (2006) (noting that “cooperative regulation permits and fosters the development of 
trust between regulators and those subject to regulation” which further legitimates the re-
gime, and “laws that are seen as legitimate are often obeyed”); see also Josh Bowers & Paul 
H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Le-
gitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 265 n.261 (2012) (noting that 
individuals who perceived a legal regime as fair are more likely to cooperate in the en-
forcement of the regime). 
 254.  See Michael L. Rich, Lessons of Disloyalty in the World of Criminal Informants, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1493, 1522 (2012) (“When people believe that the law and law enforcement 
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In addition to ratcheting down the tension that currently exists 
between providers and the law,255 a system that ceded more power to a 
disinterested clinical expert would allow medicine, and modern clini-
cal standards that change quickly, to drive the regulation of fraud, 
likely scrubbing it of some of the causes of overenforcement.  By in-
corporating the expertise of the medical profession—whether hous-
ing particular medical experts within certain DOJ offices or mandat-
ing the consultation of a group of trusted medical advisers before 
beginning an investigation—“technical” or regulatory violations 
would likely never yield a time-consuming and reputation-risking 
health care fraud investigation.  Instead, the clinical expert would 
presumably be able to assist in discerning the difference between a 
harmful fraudulent act and a clinically beneficial one before any rep-
utational penalties result.  She would be able to note that ICDs placed 
within thirty-eight days of a myocardial infarction, based upon the 
underlying clinical realities of the patients at issue, should not be 
characterized as fraudulent. 
In addition to steering the investigation, adding an independent 
medical liaison within the DOJ investigation could allow for investi-
gated providers to petition the office, arguing at the outset that the 
clinical care administered was legitimate and appropriate.256  After 
careful review, the petition could be granted, in which case the inves-
tigation would close, or the petition could be dismissed, after which 
the investigation would continue.  This would work to protect the dis-
cretion of the federal prosecutors, but would also allow an individual 
from the medical community to determine which cases were worth 
pursuing, based upon her clinical expertise.  Within a cooperative 
regulatory framework, targeted providers may be less combative with 
the prosecutors, less hostile to the legal regime, and more willing to 
admit to mistakes—especially if they know an independent clinical 
expert is a member of the investigatory team. 
In addition to building structures that would enhance collabora-
tion and cooperation between the regulators and the regulated, and 
                                                        
are legitimate, they are more willing to actively cooperate with police by, for instance, re-
porting crimes in their neighborhoods.”). 
 255.  See McDonald, supra note 247. 
 256.  This system could resemble the Stark Law’s self-disclosure protocol.  See Self-Referral 
Disclosure Protocol, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-
Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Self_Referral_Disclosure_Protocol.html.  Perhaps the DOJ 
could field calls from providers notifying it of administration of care that would otherwise 
raise red flags.   
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in order to protect against the damaging effects of prosecuting those 
engaged in overtreatment that is innovative and legitimate, there 
should be a wider range of acceptable behavior available to providers.  
As long as patients are not being harmed, the treatment is not clearly 
unnecessary, the quality of care is excellent, and there is no discerni-
ble pattern of any scheme, providers at or close to the norm—
particularly in cutting-edge procedures and subspecialties—should be 
given deserved autonomy in making clinical decisions without having 
to worry about a blindsiding call from the DOJ.  For example, those 
who place ICDs in “technical violation” of the Medicare NCD guide-
lines should be given a pass, not a notice of investigation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Focused narrowly on limiting rising costs, federal prosecutors 
have sought to apply the anti-fraud tools to cases of overtreatment 
without attention to the impact of the strategy or the requisite flexibil-
ity that is needed to regulate both a multifaceted industry and a 
unique practice such as medicine.  Recent overtreatment investiga-
tions and settlements provide cloudy guidance, stoke provider distrust 
of the regulatory regime, and characterize a framework that seems 
unconcerned with only pursuing culpable actors who intentionally in-
flict harm on the federal health care programs and/or its beneficiar-
ies. 
By employing a random and seemingly disordered enforcement 
framework, federal prosecutors have risked further stoking tension 
between the medical and legal industries, and instead, may actually be 
deterring beneficial conduct.  With a regulatory framework so suscep-
tible to overuse and overenforcement, it seems time for a recalibra-
tion of health care fraud enforcement—one focused on a cooperative 
enterprise that prevents and punishes those who inflict clear, discern-
ible harm.  Anything less risks continuing an unsustainable overdose 
of enforcement. 
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